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“If you think Stuxnet is revolutionary then you slept through the 
revolution.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, a tech-security firm in the Republic of Belarus first 
detected the piece of computer malware now known as 
“Stuxnet.”2 Computer experts first knew Stuxnet as a hack of the 
Windows operating system, itself a substantial feat.3 Subsequent 
analysis of Stuxnet’s code, however, revealed something of far 
greater significance: Western governments, most probably Israel 
and the United States, had likely designed the computer worm 
to target an Iranian nuclear weapons facility.4 Specifically, the 
worm appears to have been constructed to destroy uranium 
enrichment centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, in an 
                                                                                                             
1. Christopher Williams, Stuxnet: Cyber Attack on Iran ‘Was Carried Out by Western 
Powers and Israel,’ TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/8274009/Stuxnet-Cyber-attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-by-Western-powers-
and-Israel.html (quoting cyber-security expert Tom Parker). 
2. See Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Worm ‘Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets,’ BBC 
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018 (stating that 
Stuxnet was discovered in Belarus in June 2010); Michael J. Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-
War, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011, at 152, 155 (describing how Sergey Ulasen, the head of 
the Belarusian tech-security firm VirusBlokAda, first received a report of an Iranian 
computer that was infected with Stuxnet). The name Stuxnet derives from the file 
names “.stub” and “MrxNet.sys” contained in Stuxnet’s code. Kim Zetter, How Digital 
Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, WIRED, (July 11, 2011, 
7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-
deciphered- stuxnet/all/1; A Worm in the Centrifuge: The Stuxnet Outbreak, ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 2, 2010, at 63, 63–64 (stating that Stuxnet’s name is derived from words found in 
its code). Malware is defined as “software that is intended to damage or disable 
computers and computer systems.” OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1060 (3d ed. 2010). 
3. See John Borland, A Four-Day Dive into Stuxnet’s Heart, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010, 
8:27 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/a-four-day-dive-into-stuxnets-
heart (describing Microsoft’s sophisticated response to Stuxnet’s impressive infiltration 
of the Windows operating system); Liam O. Murchu, Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-
Day Vulnerabilities, SYMANTEC: OFFICIAL BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-additional-zero-day-
vulnerabilities (reporting that Symantec, a tech-security firm, had discovered that 
Stuxnet exploited four vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system). 
4. See generally William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear 
Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1 (arguing that Israel aided the United States in 
developing Stuxnet specifically to strike the Natanz nuclear facility); Gross, supra note 
2, at 196 (describing how various computer scientists concluded that Western 
governments created Stuxnet to hinder the Iranian nuclear program). 
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attempt to impede Iran’s nuclear weapons program.5 Although 
Iranian officials initially denied that nuclear sites suffered any 
damage from Stuxnet, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad later confirmed that Stuxnet had infected a 
“limited number of [] centrifuges” at Iranian nuclear facilities.6 
There is, however, strong evidence that significantly greater 
damage was done to Iran’s nuclear program than President 
Ahmadinejad suggested.7 
Stuxnet seems to have had two predominant purposes. 
First, it includes code that, when executed, dramatically raised 
and lowered the centrifuges’ rotational speed, causing the 
centrifuges to destroy themselves. 8  Second, the worm sent 
signals to plant operators indicating that the centrifuges were 
working normally, so that the operators were not alerted to the 
problem and were unable to prevent the centrifuges from self-
destructing.9 
                                                                                                             
5. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (opining on how Israel and the United States 
tested Stuxnet on centrifuges identical to those used at the Natanz nuclear facility); 
Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that Stuxnet’s code targeted devices configured in groups 
of 164, and that centrifuges in Natanz were arranged in groups of 164). 
6. Janine Zacharia, In Arab States’ Fears, Israel Sees Impetus for Action Against Iran, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A15; see Iran Denies Stuxnet Disrupted Its Nuclear 
Programme, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:17 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-11821011 (noting that Iranian officials stated they had caught Stuxnet 
before it did any damage to the Iranian nuclear program). 
7. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (noting that the Iranians took 984 centrifuges at 
Natanz out of service after Stuxnet infiltrated Natanz’s network); Zetter, supra note 2 
(stating that International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance footage showed over 
1000 centrifuges being replaced at Natanz after Stuxnet). 
8. See DAVID ALBRIGHT ET AL., INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., DID STUXNET TAKE OUT 
1,000 CENTRIFUGES AT THE NATANZ ENRICHMENT PLANT? 4 (2010), available at 
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_FEP_22Dec2010.pdf 
(noting that Stuxnet destroyed centrifuges by raising the centrifuge rotation frequency 
as high as 1410 hertz); Broad et al., supra note 4 (explaining that Stuxnet sent 
centrifuges at Natanz “spinning wildly out of control”). 
9. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that Stuxnet recorded normal operations 
at Natanz and then played the recording back to plant operators, as robbers might 
during a bank heist); Ralph Langer, How to Hijack a Controller: Why Stuxnet Isn’t Just 
About Siemens’ PLCs, CONTROL GLOBAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.controlglobal.com/
articles/2011/IndustrialControllers1101.html?page=full (describing the signals sent to 
controllers and comparing them to a Hollywood movie where prerecorded video is sent 
to security guards). 
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The origins of the worm are unknown.10 The United States 
has refused to confirm or deny any involvement in Stuxnet’s 
development or deployment. 11  There is, however, strong 
evidence supporting the theory that Israel and the United States 
created Stuxnet specifically to target and damage Iran’s nuclear 
program, which, if true, represents one of the first excursions of 
governments into the murky waters of cyber war.12 
The occurrence of an event like Stuxnet is no surprise in 
light of the explosion of internet and computer technology in 
recent decades.13 Today, computers connected to the Internet 
are responsible for controlling most national infrastructure and, 
therefore, are essential to states’ everyday commercial 
functioning.14 As states increasingly depend upon information 
structures to enable commercial and government functions, 
                                                                                                             
10. See Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (speculating that Jordan may have been 
involved in Stuxnet’s development); Bruce Schneier, The Story Behind the Virus, 
FORBES.COM (Oct. 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/iran-
nuclear-computer-technology-security-stuxnet-worm.html (noting that the theory that 
Western governments developed Stuxnet is speculative). 
11. See Christopher Williams, Stuxnet Virus: US Refuses to Deny Involvement, 
TELEGRAPH (London) (May 27, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/8541587/Stuxnet-virus-US-refuses-to-deny-involvement.html 
(reporting that US Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn refused to answer a 
question from a reporter for CNBC’s “CodeWars” television program asking if the 
Department of Defense was involved in the development of Stuxnet); Kim Zetter, Senior 
Defense Official Caught Hedging on US Involvement in Stuxnet, WIRED (May 26, 2011, 2:33 
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/defense-department-stuxnet 
(characterizing US Deputy Defense Secretary Lynn’s response as “hedging”). 
12. See Cyberwar: The Meaning of Stuxnet, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 14 (stating 
that after years of speculation, Stuxnet is one of the first real-life incidents to 
demonstrate cyber war’s potential); infra Part II (describing the legal construct for 
cyber war). 
13. See Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International 
Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 303, 305 (2010) (stating that whether governments are prepared or not, cyber 
weapons are becoming commonplace). Targeting government infrastructure with 
malware is not a novel idea; the film Live Free or Die Hard, produced years before 
Stuxnet’s deployment, featured hackers attempting to destroy government 
infrastructure. See LIVE FREE OR DIE HARD (20th Century Fox 2007). 
14. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks 
in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 200 (2009) (remarking that 
information technology is “ubiquitous” and essential to “the US’s entire 
infrastructure”); Swanson, supra note 13, at 306 (describing the Internet as “a powerful 
tool for government functions, information, and mobilization, as well as commerce and 
social networking”). 
846 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:842 
these structures “tend to become [militarily desirable] targets.”15 
The low cost, anonymity, and the ability to target installations 
without necessarily causing civilian casualties make cyber-
operations an appealing method of warfare.16 As the Internet 
becomes a primary vehicle for societal function, it could also be 
used as a means to harm society.17 
This reality has not gone unnoticed by most governments. 
Over 120 countries have developed information operations 
systems.18 Security experts have gone as far as designating cyber 
threats as the greatest danger to US national security outside of 
weapons of mass destruction.19 Indeed, the Russian government 
considers cyber threats so serious that they have retained the 
right to use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber attack.20 
                                                                                                             
15. Swanson, supra note 13, at 305. 
16. See id. at 304 (noting that cyber weapons are attractive to governments because 
of their low cost and wide availability); Shackelford, supra note 14, at 200 (discussing 
the problem with attributing cyber attacks to specific parties); see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 897 (1999) (stating that cyber 
weapons are how parties can conduct “war on the cheap”). 
17. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 306 (noting that the Internet can “serve as a 
tool for conducting operations that lead to confusion, destruction, and even death”); 
see also Glenn Derene, How Vulnerable Is U.S. Infrastructure to a Major Cyber Attack?, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/military/4307521 (highlighting the “growing concern” over a cyber attack 
on civilian infrastructure). 
18. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-84, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: COMPUTER ATTACKS AT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 27 
(1996) (“[The US] Department of Energy and [the US National Security Agency] 
estimate that more than 120 countries have established computer attack capabilities.”); 
see also Government-Sponsored Cyberattacks on the Rise, McAfee Says, NETWORK WORLD, 
(Nov. 29, 2007, 3:41 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/112907-
government-cyberattacks.html (“120 countries including the United States are said to 
be launching Web espionage operations.”). 
19. See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under 
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 123 (2009) (noting that cyber weapons are the 
biggest threat to the United States “other than a weapon of mass destruction or a bomb 
on one of our major cities”); Fred Hetner, Cyber Attacks Ranked 3rd Danger Behind 
Nuclear War, EXAMINER.COM, Dec. 6, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/ny-in-new-york/
cyber-attacks-ranked-3rd-danger-behind-nuclear-war (“Some experts have said that 
cyber attacks pose the greatest threat to the United States after nuclear war and 
weapons of mass destruction . . . .”). 
20. See Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: 
Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 166 n.124 (2005) 
(quoting V.I. Tsymbal, a Russian military officer, as stating: “Russia retains the right to 
use nuclear weapons first against the means and forces of information warfare, and 
then against the aggressor state itself”); Danny Bradbury, The Fog of Cyberwar, 
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The seriousness with which governments consider cyber 
attacks highlights the emerging reality of computer network 
attacks (“CNA”) as a weapon of war and underscores the need 
for a legal framework that can adequately regulate the use of 
these new weapons. A consensus appears to exist that current 
law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) regulations are applicable to 
the use of cyber weapons, despite the absence of any LOAC 
provision explicitly stating so.21 There is an ongoing debate, 
however, as to whether current LOAC paradigms can adequately 
regulate these types of attacks.22 
In an effort to address this question, this Note analyzes the 
facts surrounding one of the few publicly known cyber attacks, 
Stuxnet, but assumes a hypothetical situation in which the 
LOAC applies. This Note thus addresses whether the 
deployment of Stuxnet conforms to the LOAC. Part I presents 
the facts of Stuxnet’s development and deployment. Part II 
briefly discusses the history of the LOAC and then describes 
LOAC principles relevant to Stuxnet. Part III then applies the 
current LOAC to Stuxnet, identifying possible violations. This 
Note concludes that, with the possible exception of certain 
“knock-on” effects, current LOAC rules adequately address 
                                                                                                             
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/feb/05/
kyrgyzstan-cyberattack-internet-access (reporting V.I. Tsymbal as stating that Russia may 
use nuclear weapons against sources of cyber war). 
21. Knut Dörmann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ¶ 29 (May 19, 2001), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5p2alj (stating that the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) applies to 
cyber weapons just as it would to any other new technology); see Michael N. Schmitt, 
Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365, 
369 (2002) (stating that cyber weapons are covered under the LOAC and that there is 
“no lawless void” during an armed conflict). 
22. Compare Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A 
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1148–
49 (2003) (arguing that the application of traditional analysis, including distinction, 
proportionality, and the balance between military necessity and humanity, sufficiently 
regulates computer network attacks (“CNAs”), and that new agreements are not 
needed), with Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the 
Emergence of Cyber Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 602, 667 (2011) 
(“[D]elay in the formation of international treaties, limiting the use of and defining 
the status of cyber warfare under international law, risks devastating global 
repercussions.”). 
848 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:842 
Stuxnet and that Stuxnet therefore demonstrates the LOAC’s 
capability of regulating cyber war.23 
I. STUXNET 
In order to understand the application of the LOAC to 
Stuxnet, this Part offers an overview of the Stuxnet worm and 
the consequences of its deployment at the Natanz enrichment 
facility in Iran. First, Section A provides a general explanation of 
computer worms and a comparison to other types of malware. 
Next, Section B describes how Stuxnet worked. Section C then 
turns to the theories behind the development of Stuxnet and 
Section D recounts the damage that Stuxnet caused at the 
Natanz facility. Section E describes Stuxnet’s proliferation and 
its effects worldwide. Finally, Section F draws conclusions about 
the Stuxnet worm and sets forth a set of hypothetical facts that 
the rest of this Note assumes. 
A. Computer Worms Generally 
Simply put, a computer worm is a piece of computer code 
that replicates without a human user’s commands by copying 
itself onto another computer in a network.24 Malware such as 
worms can therefore contain nothing other than an instruction 
to self-replicate.25 While this may seem harmless, a worm that has 
located a vulnerability in a network or computer’s security 
system can “clog” both the computer itself and the servers on 
the network with useless self-replications, thereby causing 
                                                                                                             
23. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 (implying that knock-on effects are 
consequences from an attack that a commander did not intend or plan to occur); 
Schmitt, supra note 21, at 392 (describing knock-on effects as “second-tier” effects not 
“directly and immediately caused by the attack, but nevertheless the product thereof”). 
24. See PETER SZOR, THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE 314 
(2005) (“[W]orms usually do not need to infect files but propagate as standalone 
programs.”); What Is a Computer Worm?, ANTIVIRUS WORLD, http://antivirusworld.com/
articles/computer-worm.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (“A computer worm is a self-
replicating computer program . . . [that is] self-contained and does not need to be part 
of another program to propagate itself.”). This differs from a computer “virus,” which 
is a piece of code that “attaches itself” to an existing program on the computer and 
modifies that program in a harmful way. See What Is a Computer Worm?, supra (noting a 
virus attaches to, and becomes a part of, an executable file). 
25. See SZOR, supra note 24, at 296 (“[T]he majority of computer viruses do 
nothing but replicate.”); What Is a Computer Worm?, supra note 24 (noting that a self-
replicating worm can do significant damage). 
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significant damage.26 Program designers therefore attempt to 
prevent the introduction of worms into their systems by 
upgrading their programs, while malware designers search for 
new weaknesses in the program’s defense.27 
B. Stuxnet’s Code and Its Effects 
Like most worms, Stuxnet’s code causes it to spread to a 
new computer on the network whenever it detects one, 
regardless of the type of programs the new computer is 
running.28 Stuxnet, however, differs from many worms in that, in 
addition to containing code for self-replication, it also contains a 
“payload” designed to give specific commands to other 
programs.29 A payload is code that typically accomplishes the 
“purpose” of the malware.30 After Stuxnet infects a computer, it 
attempts to find out whether Siemens’ WinCC/PCS7 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition software (“Siemens’ 
SCADA software”) is present on the computer. 31  Siemens’ 
                                                                                                             
26. See SZOR, supra note 24, at 297 (explaining the danger of excessive self-
replication); What Is a Computer Worm?, supra note 24 (describing the Mydoom worm, 
which caused a worldwide internet slowdown through its unchecked self-replication). 
27. See, e.g., Microsoft Issues Biggest Patch on Record, REUTERS, Oct. 13, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/13/us-microsoft-security-
idUSTRE 59C5EJ20091013 (stating that Microsoft updated its operating system to fix 
vulnerabilities); Matthew J. Schwartz, Microsoft, Adobe Patch Vulnerabilities, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 14, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
news/security/app-security/231601407 (noting that Adobe updated its software to fix 
“critical security issues”). 
28. See ALEKSANDRA MATROSOV ET AL., ESET, STUXNET UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
10, available at http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_ Under_ the_ 
Microscope.pdf (“Once self-replicating code is released, it’s difficult to exercise 
complete control over where it goes, what it does, and how far it spreads . . . .”); Gross, 
supra note 2, at 158 (explaining how Stuxnet moves through a computer network). 
29. See NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, W32.STUXNET 
DOSSIER 2 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/
media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf (“[Stuxnet] modifies 
code on the Siemens PLCs to potentially sabotage the system.”); MATROSOV ET. AL, 
supra note 28, at 10 (noting that Stuxnet’s “payload” is targeted at Siemens’ 
WinCC/PCS7 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition software (“Siemens’ SCADA 
software”)). 
30. See Payload Definition, PC MAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_
term/0,2542,t=payload&i=48909,00.asp#fbid=56CJhRA5C9H (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) 
(“In the analysis of worms . . . it refers to the software’s harmful results.”). 
31. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 33 (“When [Siemens’ SCADA software] 
is found inside a project folder, the project may be infected.”); see also Gross, supra note 
2, at 158 (stating that Stuxnet specifically searches for Siemens’ software). 
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SCADA software is a system that coordinates certain types of 
industrial hardware, overseeing and controlling basic 
components of an industrial system. 32  If Siemens’ SCADA 
software is not present, Stuxnet “deactivates” and becomes an 
inert piece of code.33  
If Stuxnet detects Siemens’ SCADA software, it then looks 
to see if the software is being used to control a programmable 
logic controller (“PLC”). 34  PLCs are small computers that 
typically control simple industrial tasks such as regulating 
motors and opening and closing valves.35 Once Stuxnet detects 
the PLC, it searches to see if a certain type of machinery is 
attached to the PLC.36 If Stuxnet finds the correct machinery, it 
checks to see if that component is operating under a specified 
set of conditions—most notably a specific speed at which the 
                                                                                                             
32. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (describing Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition systems as running “whole symphonies of industrial instruments, sensors 
and machines”); Kim Zetter, SCADA System’s Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for 
Years, WIRED (July 19, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/
siemens-scada/ (“SCADA, short for ‘supervisory control and data acquisition,’ systems 
are programs installed in utilities and manufacturing facilities to manage their 
operations.”). 
33. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (describing how Stuxnet only deploys 
its payload on a computer with Siemens’ SCADA software installed); Gross, supra note 
2, at 158 (stating that Stuxnet “becomes a useless, inert feature on the network” if 
Siemens’ SCADA software is not detected). 
34. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 36 (noting that Stuxnet attempts to 
monitor programmable logic controllers (“PLCs”)); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (“When 
Stuxnet moves into a computer, it attempts to spread to every machine on that 
computer’s network and to find out whether any [PLCs] are running Siemens 
software.”). 
35. See Paul Marks, Why the Stuxnet Worm Is Like Nothing Seen Before, NEWSCIENTIST 
(Jan. 18, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19504-why-the-
stuxnet-worm-is-like-nothing-seen-before.html (describing PLCs as controlling the 
process of industrial automation); Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that PLCs are involved 
in the control of “everything from motors in packaging assembly lines to critical valves 
in gas pipelines”). 
36. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that Stuxnet only “kicked into gear” in 
the presence of specific machinery); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (explaining that 
Stuxnet “fingerprints” the PLC and looks for a specific type of machinery). 
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machinery rotates.37 Finally, if the conditions are met, Stuxnet 
delivers its payload.38 
Stuxnet’s payload appears to be designed to achieve two 
things. First, it sends instructions to the PLCs to initiate quick 
changes in the centrifuge’s rotational frequencies.39 These quick 
speed changes “sabotage[] the normal operation of the 
industrial control process.” 40  Although other machines or 
equipment may be unaffected by these changes in motor speed, 
the shifts cause harm to uranium centrifuges.41 Second, the 
worm also installs a rootkit—software that enables undetectable 
access to a computer—which is able to send signals to facility 
operators that the PLCs are functioning normally. 42  System 
operators are therefore unable to recognize the problem and 
disconnect the motors from the PLC.43 
To achieve all this, Stuxnet itself must also be able to 
effectively hide from detection. When Stuxnet spreads, it uses a 
“digital signature” to verify its authenticity with the newly 
infected host computer. 44  Digital signatures are likened to 
“passports for software: proof of identity for programs crossing 
                                                                                                             
37. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 41 (stating that Stuxnet’s designers 
expected “the frequency drives to be running between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz”); Gross, 
supra note 2, at 158 (noting that Stuxnet checks to see if the PLC component is 
operating under specific conditions). 
38. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 (noting that Stuxnet’s goal is to modify 
code on the Siemens PLCs); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (stating that if the conditions 
are met, Stuxnet delivers its “rogue code”). 
39. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Worm in Iran Was Perfect for Sabotaging 
Nuclear Centrifuges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A1 (“Stuxnet does its damage by 
making quick changes in the rotational speed of motors, shifting them rapidly up and 
down.”); FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 43 (“Stuxnet sabotages the system by 
slowing down or speeding up the motor to different rates at different times.”). 
40. Broad & Sanger, supra note 39. 
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet caused the PLCs 
to change the centrifuges’ rotational frequencies). 
42. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (noting that Stuxnet installs both 
windows and PLC rootkits); Definition of Rootkit, PC MAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=root+kit&i=55733,00.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
43. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 49 (“Stuxnet records the previous 
operating frequencies for the frequency controllers. This data is played back . . . during 
the sabotage routines.”); Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that because of the rootkit 
Stuxnet made it “appear[ed] that everything was operating normally while the 
centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.”). 
44. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (describing how Stuxnet contains an 
authentic certificate); Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (comparing Stuxnet’s use of an 
authentic digital signature to a teenager’s use of a fake ID to get into a bar). 
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the border between one machine and the next.”45 Initially, 
Stuxnet’s signature was obtained from Realtek Semiconductor 
Corporation (“Realtek”), an electronics manufacturer.46 This 
signature enabled Stuxnet to gain access to computers it would 
otherwise have been prevented from infecting.47 
The features described in this Section make Stuxnet a 
remarkable piece of malware.48 It is a worm that, when released 
into any network in the world, can seek out a well-defined target, 
deliver its payload, and then hide the fact that it caused any 
damage. 49  Indeed, Stuxnet has been called a “self-directed 
stealth drone.”50 Not only does Stuxnet locate specific targets, 
but it also limits its destructive forces to those targets in a way 
that kinetic weapons cannot.51 In essence, Stuxnet is a computer 
worm that can perform the function of a traditional kinetic 
weapon, only with greater precision.52 It represents a major new 
development in warfare technology.53 
                                                                                                             
45. Gross, supra note 2, at 155. 
46. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (“The [Stuxnet] driver file is a 
digitally signed with a legitimate Realtek digital certificate.”); MATROSOV ET AL., supra 
note 28, at 13 (noting that Stuxnet was initially signed with a certificate from Realtek 
Semiconductor Corporation (“Realtek”)).  
47. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (stating that the Realtek signature was the 
equivalent of “carrying a cops badge”); Zetter, supra note 2 (explaining that Stuxnet 
used the Realtek signature “in order to fool systems into thinking the malware was a 
trusted program from Realtek”). 
48. See Ken Dilanian, Iran and the Era of Cyber War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A1 
(calling Stuxnet “game-changing”); Cyberwar: The Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12 
(noting that computer security experts have described Stuxnet as “amazing,” 
“groundbreaking,” and “impressive”). 
49. See Gross, supra note 2, at 159 (stating that Stuxnet can hide “both its 
existence and its effects until after the damage is done”); see also supra notes 28–53 and 
accompanying text (describing how Stuxnet works generally). 
50. Gross, supra note 2, at 159. 
51. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (quoting White House terrorism advisor Richard 
Clarke as calling Stuxnet “precision-guided munition”); Cyberwar: The Meaning of 
Stuxnet, supra note 12 (noting Stuxnet’s obvious appeal to military advisors because of 
its ability to disable a specific target while avoiding a traditional kinetic military strike). 
52. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (“The Stuxnet worm seems to have inflicted 
significant damage on Iran’s nuclear program, cyber experts say, with none of the 
dangerous repercussions of a U.S. or Israeli airstrike, at least so far.”); Cyberwar: The 
Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12 (calling Stuxnet a “cyber missile”). 
53. Gross, supra note 2 (“Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war”); Cyberwar: The 
Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12 (referring to Stuxnet as a “new kind of cyber attack”).  
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C. Stuxnet’s Development and Deployment 
As set forth in Section B, Stuxnet is an extremely unique 
piece of malware. The identity of its creators, however, is 
unclear. To substantiate the theories that allege that Israel and 
the United States created and deployed Stuxnet, this Section 
examines Stuxnet’s distinguishing characteristics and other 
pieces of evidence relating to its development and deployment. 
The limitation of Stuxnet’s payload delivery to such a small, 
well-defined group of computers is unusual in malware. 54 
Typically, malware designers attempt to infect and cause harm 
to as many computers as possible.55 A worm that “activates” only 
when specific parameters are met runs contrary to the objectives 
of most malware programmers. 56  This specialization alone 
differentiates Stuxnet from most pieces of malware. 
The worm also remarkably contains four “zero-day” 
Windows hacks, as well as a “zero-day” hack of the Siemens’ 
SCADA software.57 A zero-day hack exposes a vulnerability in a 
piece of software that was previously unknown to the 
developer.58 Since most computers worldwide run Windows, a 
                                                                                                             
54. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the uniqueness of a 
narrow range of payload delivery in malware). 
55. See, e.g., Stefanie Hoffman, Conficker Worm Spreads Fast, Infects Millions, CRN, 
(Jan. 23, 2009, 5:17 PM), http://www.crn.com/news/security/212902319/conficker-
worm-spreads-fast-infects-millions.htm (stating that the Conficker worm has infected at 
“least nine million” computers); Eric Larkin, Protecting Against the Rampant Conficker 
Worm, PCWORLD (Jan. 16, 2009, 2:31 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/157876/
protecting_against_the_rampant_conficker_worm.html (noting that in less than four 
days the number of Conficker infections leapt from 2.4 million to 8.9 million). For 
example, the Conficker worm spread indiscriminately and delivered its payload to 
more than nine million computers worldwide. See Hoffman, supra. 
56. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Storm Worm Botnet More Powerful Than Top 
Supercomputers, INFORMATIONWEEK, (Sept. 6, 2007, 3:50 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/201804528 (stating that the Storm Botnet is 
used for attacks that snowball, becoming more effective as additional computers are 
infected). An example of a more typical piece of malware is the Storm Botnet worm 
that may have infected up to fifty million computers in 2007, with each infection 
helping to accomplish its purpose of creating a network of “zombie computers.” See id. 
57. See Murchu, supra note 3 (stating that Stuxnet uses four zero-day 
vulnerabilities and that was the first time Symantec has encountered this kind of 
malware); see also FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 55 (“[Stuxnet] exploit[s] four 0-day 
vulnerabilities.”); Zetter, supra note 2 (noting the presence of four zero-day hacks). 
58. See BYRON ACOHIDO & JON SWARTZ, ZERO DAY THREAT 5 (2008) (explaining 
that a zero-day threat “refers to a virus designed to take advantage of a security hole for 
which no patch exists. No patch exists because the bad guys discover the hole”); Zetter, 
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zero-day Windows hack is quite valuable. 59  As such, 
programmers almost never use more than one in a single piece 
of malware.60 
The presence of four zero-day hacks speaks to the 
extremely high value of Stuxnet’s target, the Iranian nuclear 
facility. A zero-day hack can only be effectively utilized one time; 
once the malware is distributed and the computing world 
becomes aware of the zero-day hack, updates from the software 
manufacturer quickly eliminate the vulnerability.61 Since the 
four zero-day hacks have an estimated value of hundreds of 
thousands of dollarsexcluding the value of the Realtek 
signatureit would only seem logical to use them together in 
Stuxnet only if the target was extremely valuable to the 
attacker.62 
Additionally, the use of zero-day hacks demonstrates the 
possibility of numerous programmers working with a substantial 
                                                                                                             
supra note 2 (“[Zero-day hacks] exploit vulnerabilities in software that are yet unknown 
to the software maker or antivirus vendors.”). 
59. See Robert Lemos, Bug Brokers Offering Higher Bounty, SECURITYFOCUS (Jan. 23, 
2007), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11437 (noting that zero-day exploits can 
sell for upwards of US$100,000); see also CHARLES MILLER, INDEP. SEC. EVALUATORS, 
THE LEGITIMATE VULNERABILITIES MARKET: THE SECRETIVE WORLD OF 0-DAY EXPLOIT 
SALES, available at http://securityevaluators.com/files/papers/0daymarket.pdf 
(estimating that the value of some exploits had reached US$250,000). 
60. Miltiadis, Is Stuxnet the ‘Best’ Malware Ever?, TECH.BOX (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.the-techbox.com/news/is-stuxnet-the-best-malware-ever-part-13/ (calling 
Stuxnet’s use of multiple zero-day hacks “unprecedented”). Zero-day hacks also are 
quite rare. See Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that of the millions of pieces of malware 
developed each year, fewer than a dozen exploit zero-day vulnerabilities). 
61. See, e.g., Adobe Issues Patch for ‘Critical’ Zero-Day Vulnerability in Flash, GOV’T 
COMPUTER NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://gcn.com/articles/2011/09/22/adobe-flash-
patch-zero-day-exploit.aspx (explaining that when Adobe learned of a zero-day exploit 
they issued an “out of cycle” patch to eliminate the vulnerability); see also John E. 
Dunn, ‘Duqu’ Zero-Day Windows Flaw Patched This Week, ITWORLD (Dec. 13, 2011, 9:48 
AM), http://www.itworld.com/operating-systems/232703/duqu-zero-day-windows-flaw-
patched-week (reporting that Microsoft reacted to a zero-day exploited by the so-called 
Duqu malware by patching their software about a month later). 
62. See Zetter, supra note 2 (“[G]iven that they were using four zero-days to do it, 
the targets had to be high-value.”). There is no doubt that the United States considers 
disabling Iran’s nuclear program to be extremely valuable. In 2007, President George 
W. Bush said that a nuclear-armed Iran could mean “World War III.” See, e.g., Holly 
Rozenkrantz & Roger Runningen, Bush Says a Nuclear-Armed Iran Risks ‘World War III,’ 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2007, 11:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aNfIRh0cknik&refer=home (reporting President George W. Bush’s 
concern that a nuclear-armed Iran constituted a “threat to world peace”). 
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budget.63 Some analysts have estimated that it could have taken 
five to ten programmers upwards of six months to create 
Stuxnet. 64  Put simply, Stuxnet is a significant technological 
achievement and represents the work of a well-financed, well-
connected, and well-organized group of programmers, not a few 
individual hackers.65 The novelty of the worm, combined with 
attack mechanisms that targeted several previously unknown 
vulnerabilities in Windows, has led to Stuxnet’s description as 
“one of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever.”66 
While this evidence establishes that Stuxnet’s developers 
were both well-financed and well-organized, there is additional 
evidence supporting the theory that Israel and the United States 
were involved. First, it is hard to imagine another purpose for 
such a highly specialized piece of malware. The narrow range of 
circumstances in which Stuxnet would deploy its payload makes 
it unlikely that Stuxnet had another purpose besides destroying 
nuclear centrifuges.67 Second, the governments’ responses to 
news of the worm are suspicious; when Israeli officials were 
asked about their involvement in the worm they “broke[] into 
wide smiles.” 68  The United States has refused to deny 
involvement in Stuxnet.69 Perhaps most convincingly, a video 
tribute played at the retirement party of a former Israeli Defense 
                                                                                                             
63. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (describing the resources 
necessary to develop malware as sophisticated as Stuxnet). 
64. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (“The full cycle may have taken six 
months and five to ten core developers not counting numerous other individuals, such 
as quality assurance and management.”). Others have put the number closer to thirty. 
See Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (noting that as many as thirty programmers may have 
worked on Stuxnet). 
65. See Iran Accuses Siemens over Stuxnet Cyber Attack, TELEGRAPH (London) 
(Apr. 17, 2011, 11:26 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8457658/
Iran-accuses-Siemens-over-Stuxnet-cyber-attack.html (noting that an Iranian 
commander speculated that Siemens may have given proprietary information to the US 
government to aid in the development of Stuxnet); Williams, supra note 1 (positing 
that the designers of Stuxnet would have needed both programming expertise and 
access to tightly regulated nuclear equipment to produce malware capable of harming 
Iran’s nuclear program). 
66. Fildes, supra note 2. 
67. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text (describing the limits placed on 
delivery of Stuxnet’s payload). 
68. Broad & Sanger, supra note 39. 
69. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing how US Deputy Defense 
Secretary William Lynn refused to deny that the United States was involved in Stuxnet). 
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Force Chief of General Staff featured references to Stuxnet as 
one of the general’s operational successes.70 
Traditional covert operations were probably necessary to 
infect the Natanz facility’s network as well. Natanz’s control 
system is a closed-network that is not connected to the 
Internet.71 This means that Stuxnet would probably have needed 
to infect Natanz through a removable drive or a personal 
computer plugged directly into the network. 72  Alternatively, 
someone could have infected a Natanz employee’s personal 
computer, then waited for that employee to attach the computer 
to the network and unwittingly infect the network.73 
Stuxnet’s code also contains numerous commands that 
appear, counterintuitively, to limit the ability of the worm to 
spread. The worm contains a “self-destruct” command that will 
destroy Stuxnet on June 24, 2012.74 One of the hallmarks of 
Stuxnet’s code is that, once infected, a computer can only 
transmit the worm to three other computers, which is a 
restriction that runs contrary to the traditional objectives of 
malware programmers.75 These “fail-safes” appear to be add-ons 
                                                                                                             
70. See Video Links Israel to Cyber Attack on Iran, TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 16, 
2011, at 17 (“The video of Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi’s operational successes included 
references to Stuxnet . . . .”); Gross, supra note 2, at 197 (“[G]uests at a retirement 
party for Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi 
watched a video tribute to his career highlights—which included a reference to 
Stuxnet.”). 
71. ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (“[T]he Natanz control systems are not 
connected to the internet . . . .”); Kim Zetter, Surveillance Footage and Code Clues Indicate 
Stuxnet Hit Iran, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2011, 6:03 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2011/02/isis-report-stuxnet (“Natanz’s PLCs are not connected to the internet . . . .”). 
72. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (“[Stuxnet] needed to travel on a 
removable drive . . . to the Natanz control system.”); FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 
(noting that Stuxnet “may have been introduced by removable drive”). 
73. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (speculating that Stuxnet’s controllers 
could have targeted Natanz personnel’s personal computers); FALLIERE ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 3 (hypothesizing that Stuxnet may have spread through a ”willing or 
unknowing third party”). 
74. See Kim Zetter, New Clues Point to Israel As Author of Blockbuster Worm, or Not, 
WIRED (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/stuxnet-
deconstructed (“An apparent ‘kill’ date in the code indicates that Stuxnet is designed 
to stop working June 24, 2012.”); see also Schneier, supra note 10 (stating Stuxnet has a 
self-destruct date of June 24, 2012). 
75. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 29 (noting that once Stuxnet infects 
three removable drives, the original is deleted); Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (“The USB-
spreading code, for instance, limits the number of devices that each infected device can 
itself infect. (The limit is three, enough to create a moderate chain reaction, but not so 
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by programmers that are concerned about subsequent 
infections by Stuxnet. 76  Former US counterterrorism czar 
Richard Clarke stated Stuxnet’s code “just says lawyers all over 
it.”77 As discussed later in the Note, this suggests that Stuxnet’s 
programmers considered the LOAC, and designed Stuxnet to 
conform to its principles.78 
D. The Natanz Facility and Stuxnet’s Damage 
The Natanz uranium enrichment facility is located outside 
of the city of Natanz, with a large portion of the facility buried 
underground.79 It runs centrifuges that spin gaseous uranium to 
“separate fissile U-235 atoms from the denser U-238 atoms.”80 
Uranium with higher percentages of U-235, or “enriched 
uranium,” is an essential component in nuclear weapons.81 Iran 
                                                                                                             
many that its effects would rage out of control.)”); supra notes 54–56 and 
accompanying text (explaining that, traditionally, malware is designed to infect as 
many systems as quickly as possible). 
76. See Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (quoting Richard Clarke as saying that a 
“responsible government . . . [would] have to prevent collateral damage”). 
77. Id. 
78. See infra Part III (noting that although the LOAC did not apply to Stuxnet, its 
programmers gave up operational effectiveness to comply with LOAC rules). 
79. See David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Inst. Sci. & Int’l Sec., The Iranian Gas 
Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz: Drawing from Commercial Satellite 
Images (2003), available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/
natanz03_02.html (describing the Natanz facility as a high-security uranium 
enrichment facility that includes numerous underground buildings); IAEA Envoys Visit 
Iran’s Natanz Enrichment Site: Report, Reuters, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/01/16/us-iran-nuclear-natanz-idUSTRE70 F12 F2 0 110116 (stating that the 
Natanz uranium enrichment is located underground). 
80. Iran Increases Uranium Enrichment—IAEA, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10925381 (stating that Natanz centrifuges 
spin uranium hexafluoride gas to separate U-235 from U-238 atoms); see Iran and Syria: 
Next Steps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) 
(statement of Olli J. Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard University) (stating that Natanz produces enriched 
uranium). 
81. See Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons, INT’L PANEL FISSILE MATERIALS, 
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/fissile/production/ 
production.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (citing INT’L PANEL FISSILE MATERIALS, 2006 
GLOBAL FISSILE MATERIAL REPORT) (explaining that isolating the U-235 isotope is 
essential for the production of a nuclear weapon); Mark D. Sameit, Note, Killing and 
Cleaning in Combat: A Proposal to Extend the Foreign Claims Act to Long-Term Environmental 
Damage, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 547, 575 (2008) (“The enriched U-235 
is known as ‘enriched uranium’ and can be used in commercial or military reactors, or 
as fuel for nuclear weapons.”). 
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has repeatedly stated that their nuclear program is peaceful and 
its only purpose is to generate nuclear power.82 US officials, 
however, doubt Iran’s claims, and believe that the purpose of 
the facility at Natanz is to secure weapons-grade uranium.83 
As previously explained, Stuxnet was most likely designed to 
destroy centrifuges at Natanz by systematically raising and 
lowering their rotational speed. 84  Stuxnet seems to have 
succeeded in this respect. Subsequent to the date of infection, 
international inspectors reported that Iran was experiencing 
severe problems with its centrifuges and that several hundred 
had been shut down.85 An inspection in late 2009 revealed that 
close to 1000 centrifuges had been removed from Natanz since 
the previous summer.86 It appears that this has caused significant 
delays to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.87 
The extent of the damage done to the Iranian nuclear 
program is unknown. There are reports that Iran successfully 
contained much of the damage caused by Stuxnet and replaced 
                                                                                                             
82. See Iran’s President Says Bush Pushing for War, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, Sept. 19, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14911603/ns/nightly_news/t/irans-president-
says-bush-pushing-war/ (quoting President Ahmadinejad in an interview with NBC as 
saying, “[w]e are against the atomic bomb”); see also Alan Cowell & Michael Slackman, 
Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at A4 (quoting 
President Ahmadinejad as saying, “[w]hen we say we won’t build [a nuclear weapon] 
that means we won’t”). 
83. See Charles J. Moxley, Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review: An Ambitious Program for 
Nuclear Arms Control but a Retreat from the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament, 34 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 734, 767 (2011) (noting that the Obama administration has stated it seeks to 
reverse Iran’s ambition to acquire a nuclear weapon); Mark Landler, Clinton Says 
Sanctions Have Stalled Iran’s Effort to Make Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at 
A4 (describing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s concern over Iran’s effort to 
acquire nuclear weapons). 
84. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing the method by 
which Stuxnet destroyed the centrifuges at Natanz). 
85. See Broad & Sanger, supra note 39 (stating that reports issued by international 
inspectors show Iran removed hundreds of centrifuges in 2009); Zetter, supra note 71 
(explaining that surveillance footage from the United Nations showed Iranian workers 
dismantling ten percent of the plant’s centrifuges). 
86. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (“[W]hen international inspectors visited Natanz 
in late 2009, they found that the Iranians had taken out of service a total of exactly 984 
machines that had been running the previous summer.”); Zetter, supra note 2 (stating 
that International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance footage at Natanz showed 
between 1000 and 2000 centrifuges being replaced after the Stuxnet attack). 
87. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (commenting that the destruction of centrifuges 
at Natanz helped delay, but not destroy, Iran’s nuclear weapons program); Williams, 
supra note 1 (stating that Iranian officials confirmed that Stuxnet had set back their 
nuclear program). 
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many of the broken centrifuges.88 It is likely, however, that 
Stuxnet affected the Iranian nuclear program in other ways. Iran 
appears to be suffering from a shortage of certain types of 
metals that are needed to run the machines, and usable metal 
was lost because of Stuxnet. 89  Additionally, Stuxnet almost 
certainly had a psychological effect on the Iranians; a facility 
they thought to be completely secure was infected with malware 
whose designers possessed a high degree of knowledge about 
Natanz’s centrifuges and the facility generally.90 Finally, to be 
fully rid of the worm, Iran would most likely have to replace all 
the computer systems in the nuclear program, an exceedingly 
difficult proposition for a country under strict trade sanctions.91 
Consequently, Israeli intelligence officials delayed their 
estimates for when Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon to 2015.92 
This was not the first time that Western nations attempted 
to hinder an Arab country’s nuclear program. In 2007, Israel 
launched F-15 fighter jets to bomb a Syrian facility believed to be 
an underground nuclear reactor.93 The facility was completely 
                                                                                                             
88. Iran’s Centrifuges Again Enriching Uranium at Full Speed, Late 2010 Lull Attributed 
to Stuxnet Computer Worm, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 2011, at 20 (stating that after a 
decline in production because of Stuxnet, uranium enrichment regained “full speed”); 
Joby Warrick, Iran Recovered Swiftly in Wake of Cyberattack, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2011, at 
A1 (stating Iran responded with an effort to “contain the damage and replace broken 
parts”). 
89. See DAVID ALBRIGHT ET AL., INST. SCI. & INT’L SEC., STUXNET MALWARE AND 
NATANZ: UPDATE OF ISIS DECEMBER 22, 2010 REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://isis-
online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_update_15Feb2011.pdf (noting 
that Iran is facing a shortage of raw materials to build centrifuges); Joby Warrick, Iran 
‘Set Back’ on Nuclear Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A1 (reporting that a 
shortage in materials caused Iran to construct centrifuges from an inferior type of 
metal). 
90. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (noting that “reconnaissance” was 
necessary for Stuxnet’s designers to understand how PLCs were configured at the 
attack site); Warrick, supra note 89 (“[Stuxnet’s] designers possessed highly detailed 
knowledge of Natanz’s centrifuges and how they are interconnected . . . .”). 
91. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (quoting cyber security expert Ralph Langner as 
saying that replacing all the nuclear program’s computer systems would be necessary to 
delete the worm and would constitute “a tall order for a country under sanctions”). 
92. See Mark Landler, Clinton Urges Gulf States to Maintain Iran Sanctions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A4 (stating that Meir Dagan, an Israeli intelligence official, said 
that Iran’s nuclear program will not produce a nuclear weapon before 2015); Warrick, 
supra note 89 ([“Israel’s] outgoing intelligence chief estimated . . . that the Islamic 
republic could not have a bomb before 2015.”). 
93. See Con Coughlin, The Real Reason Why a Syria Base Was Wiped Off the Map, 
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 25, 2008, at 23 (explaining that Israeli F-15’s struck the 
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destroyed, leaving only “a big hole in the desert.” 94  In 
comparison, Stuxnet managed to strike only the centrifuges at 
Natanz, without affecting the civilians working in the plant, or 
causing damage to civilian computer systems connected to the 
Natanz network.95 
E. Stuxnet’s Proliferation Outside Natanz 
Stuxnet’s discovery triggered a sense of panic among many 
industrial firms. Western nations, after a cursory analysis of 
Stuxnet’s code, feared that the worm might attack all PLCs 
worldwide. 96  Such an attack could cause the shutdown of 
factories, power plants, and other facilities vital to the 
functioning of civil society.97 These fears, however, were never 
realized. 
Because Stuxnet spreads indiscriminately, despite the 
limitations described above, it has spread throughout the 
globe.98 As of this moment, it is unclear how many computers 
Stuxnet has infected, but a September 2010 Symantec study 
                                                                                                             
Syrian facility); David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Analysts Find Israel Struck a Syrian 
Nuclear Project, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at A1 (stating that Israel struck a site “analysts 
judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor”). 
94. Syria Complains to U.N. About Israeli Airstrike, CNN WORLD, Sept. 11, 2007, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-11/world/israel.syria_1_israeli-airstrike-syrian- foreign-
minister-walid-syrian-government?_s=PM:WORLD (discussing the magnitude of the 
destruction caused by the Israeli airstrike). 
95. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (detailing the lack of damage to 
civilian computers); supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (proving the lack of any 
physical harm to individuals at Natanz). 
96. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (noting that Stuxnet had “the potential to bring 
industrial society to a halt”); Zetter, supra note 2 (explaining that Stuxnet’s intial 
researcher’s website was “beseiged” with visits and that he “perfom[ed] a huge public 
service to help protect critical infrastructures”). 
97. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (stating that PLCs, in addition to controlling the 
speed of the centrifuges at Natanz, are more commonly involved in the operation of 
factories, power plants, and construction projects all over the world); Schneier, supra 
note 10 (noting that PLCs control systems that operate in factories, chemical plants, oil 
refineries, and nuclear power plants). 
98. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3–5 (noting that Stuxnet infected 
computers in Azerbaijan, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, the United 
States, and numerous others); MATROSOV ET AL., supra note 28, at 15 (citing Iran, 
Indonesia, and India as the three countries with the most Stuxnet infections). 
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showed over 100,000 infections worldwide. 99  The worm, 
however, appears to have done little harm. Stuxnet infected only 
twenty-four industrial systems outside Iran, and there have been 
no documented cases, outside of the Iranian nuclear facilities, in 
which Stuxnet’s payload was activated and delivered.100 As such, 
there seem to be no incidents of industrial damage linked to 
Stuxnet.101 At this point, Stuxnet’s main impact on the general 
computing world has been limited to the nuisance of deleting 
the worm off infected systems, and even that has been minor, as 
Stuxnet does not replicate to a point that it inhibits computer or 
network functions.102 
This, however, may not be the end of the story for damage 
traceable to Stuxnet. Computer-science experts warned that 
Stuxnet’s code could be a model for third parties to attack other 
industrial facilities and hypothesized that Stuxnet’s proliferation 
has increased the risk of similar cyber attacks worldwide.103 This 
hypothesis appears to have been accurate: internet-security firms 
detected a “relative” of Stuxnet, one that appears to utilize 
                                                                                                             
99. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 5 (noting over 100,000 Stuxnet 
infections); Zetter, supra note 2 (stating that there have been more than 100,000 
Stuxnet infections). 
100. See SIMATIC WinCC / SIMATIC PCS 7: Information About 
Malware / Viruses / Trojan Horses, SIEMENS INDUSTRY SERVICE & SUPPORT, 
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/llisapi.dll?func=ll&objid=43876783&
nodeid0=10805583&caller=view&lang=en&siteid=cseus&aktprim=0&
objaction=csopen&extranet=standard&viewreg=WW#Recommended_
procedure%200408 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011) (stating that a total of twenty-four 
Siemens customers in the industrial sector reported infections, and that “[i]n none of 
these cases did the infection have an adverse impact”). 
101. See id. (noting the absence of instances in which Stuxnet had an “adverse 
impact” on an industrial system); see also US Also Vulnerable to Stuxnet Virus, Official 
Warns, AOL NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/07/us-
also-vulnerable-to-stuxnet-virus-official-warns/ (quoting a US Department of Homeland 
Security official as saying that “it’s not clear there are [sic] any particular process within 
the United States that would have triggered the software”). 
102. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (noting the restrictions Stuxnet 
has on self-replication). 
103. See Securing Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Stuxnet: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of 
Michael J. Assante, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Board of 
Information Security Examiners of the United States) (stating that Stuxnet could serve 
as a “blueprint for future attackers”); Ellen Nakashima, Stuxnet Malware Is Blueprint for 
Computer Attacks on U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2010, at A3 (“[T]he possibility that 
Stuxnet could be used by copycats, even those who don’t intend to do harm with it, is 
causing concern among experts.”). 
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pieces of code from Stuxnet, in October 2011.104 Called the 
“Duqu” virus, this code differs substantially from Stuxnet in its 
apparent goals. Duqu appears to gather data from host 
computers, possibly compiling information for a future attack.105 
Duqu’s authors are unknown. A third party may have acquired 
Stuxnet’s code and altered it to further its own purposes, or the 
original designers of Stuxnet may also have programmed 
Duqu.106 The next phase of the Duqu attack is also unknown.107 
F. Assumptions for the Remainder of this Note 
The facts described in Part I.A–E allude to the possibility 
that Israel and the United States developed Stuxnet to target 
Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. The high value of Stuxnet’s zero-
day hacks, the discriminating nature of Stuxnet’s payload, the 
substantial budget necessary to create Stuxnet, and statements 
made by Israeli and US officials suggest that both countries 
likely played a role in Stuxnet’s development and deployment.108 
                                                                                                             
104. See Zulfikar Abbany, ‘Son of Stuxnet’ Hits European Computer Networks, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
0,,15478105,00.html (calling Duqu a “relative” of Stuxnet); Jim Finkle & Supantha 
Mukherjee, Duqu Computer Virus Prompts Indian Authorities to Seize Computer Equipment, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
10/29/duqu-computer-virus-prompts_n_1065217.html (stating Duqu’s code is similar 
to Stuxnet). 
105. SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, W32.DUQU: THE PRECURSOR TO THE NEXT 
STUXNET 1 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/
media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_
stuxnet_research.pdf (“Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from 
entities such as industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers, amongst others not 
in the industrial sector, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another 
third party.”). 
106. Compare id. (stating that Duqu probably came from the same author as 
Stuxnet), with SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team, Duqu Trojan 
Questions and Answers, DELL SECUREWORKS (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/duqu/ (suggesting that Duqu and 
Stuxnet may be unrelated). 
107. See Abbany, supra note 104 (describing Duqu as “waiting” and stealing 
information); Tony Bradley, Duqu: New Malware Is Stuxnet 2.0, PCWORLD (Oct. 18, 
2011, 2:22 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/242114/duqu_ new_ 
malware_is_stuxnet_20.html (speculating that Duqu may be gathering information to 
launch a subsequent attack). 
108. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (describing the high value of 
Stuxnet’s zero-day hacks); supra notes 28–53 and accompanying text (explaining how 
Stuxnet proliferates and delivers its payload); supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text 
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For academic purposes, this Note assumes that to be true. All 
other facts about Stuxnet, such as how the worm worked and the 
damage that it did to the nuclear installations, are analyzed 
based entirely on available evidence. 
This Note also assumes that the LOAC applies to Stuxnet. 
This is necessary to analyze whether Stuxnet violates the LOAC 
and whether the LOAC properly regulates Stuxnet. In fact and 
in law, however, the LOAC—which fully applies only during an 
armed conflict—did not apply to Stuxnet because Israel and the 
United States are not involved in an armed conflict with Iran.109 
Applying the LOAC to Stuxnet is an important exercise because 
there have been few, if any, other recorded cyber attacks to 
which the LOAC applies. It is understandably difficult to analyze 
the effectiveness of the LOAC in regulating cyber war when 
there have been no instances in which it is applicable.  It is 
therefore worthwhile to analyze an actual event—Stuxnet—
under the LOAC, even though the requisite conditions for the 
LOAC to apply were not present. This Note engages in such a 
hypothetical analysis. 
II. THE HISTORY AND SUBSTANCE OF LOAC PRINCIPLES 
RELATING TO CYBER WAR 
Despite appearing chaotic, war takes place within a legal 
framework of rules.110 International law regulates the conduct of 
                                                                                                             
(detailing the significant resources required to program Stuxnet); supra notes 11, 68, 
70 and accompanying text (illustrating the American and Israeli reactions to Stuxnet). 
109. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) art. 2, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention] (stating 
the LOAC applies during an “armed conflict” or conflict between two parties to the 
treaty even if the parties have not formally recognized a state of war between them); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) 
(“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups . . . . [The LOAC] applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts . . . until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached . . . .”). 
110. See ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 15 (2008) (“War . . . does not take place in 
a vacuum of legal rules.”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
what_is_ihl.pdf (stating that the LOAC is a set of rules that “limit the effects of armed 
conflict”). 
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belligerents during an armed conflict, irrespective of the legality 
of the initial use of force. 111  Historically, these rules were 
referred to by the Latin expression jus in bello, which means the 
rules that regulate warfare. 112  Today, they are called the 
LOAC.113 
There is no specific provision in the LOAC stating that 
LOAC restrictions apply to the use of cyber weapons.114 There 
appears, however, to be a consensus among scholars and nations 
that LOAC principles do apply to cyber war.115 As discussed 
below, the LOAC developed over many centuries and is codified 
primarily in the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and 
Additional Protocols. 116  These treaties were signed in 1907, 
1949, and 1977 respectively. 117  As such, cyber weapons are 
                                                                                                             
111. See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1276 (5th ed. 2009) 
(explaining that traditionally, under the laws of war, “deviations from the laws of war 
. . . [are] violations of international law”); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1167 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that international law “seeks to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities”); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 368 (showing that the LOAC concerns itself with 
what is and is not permissible during an armed conflict “irrespective of the legality of 
the initial resort to force by the belligerents”). 
112. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110 (“[J]us in bello means the rules relating to 
the conduct of warfare.”); SHAW, supra note 111 (stating that jus in bello regulates the 
conduct of hostilities). 
113. See Dep’t of Def., Directive 2311.01E: DoD Law of War Program (2006) 
(designating the term “law of armed conflict” as the official term used by the US 
Department of Defense to describe “international law that regulates the conduct of 
armed hostilities”). The term “international humanitarian law” is sometimes used for 
and is interchangeable with the LOAC. See, e.g., Nicholas Rostow, Wall of Reason: Alan 
Dershowitz v. the International Court of Justice, 71 ALB. L. REV. 953, 980 n.92 (2008) 
(asserting that the term “laws of war” is “[a]lso known, interchangeably, as 
‘international humanitarian law’ or ‘the law of armed conflict’”). 
114. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 1304 (noting that whether the 
LOAC applies to cyber war remains to be resolved); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 368 
(“[T]here is no provision in any humanitarian law instrument that directly addresses 
CNA . . . .”). 
115. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 22, at 1187 (“The law of war clearly applies to the 
use of CNA in armed conflict.”); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 375 (“[C]omputer network 
attacks are subject to humanitarian law if they are part and parcel of either a classic 
conflict or a “cyber war” in which injury, death, damage or destruction are intended or 
foreseeable.”). The official US position is that the LOAC applies to CNAs. See OFFICE 
OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEPT. OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 8 (1999) (stating that the use of cyber weapons to “cause 
injury, death, damage, and destruction” will be judged by applying the LOAC). 
116. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (describing the primary 
sources of the LOAC). 
117. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; First Geneva 
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regulated by rules created at times in which cyber war was either 
unimaginable or confined to the realms of science fiction; 
indeed, the earliest cyber weapons appeared in 1970s science-
fiction novels.118 Academics have therefore questioned whether 
these rules are capable of effectively regulating cyber war.119 
Scholars generally divide into two camps on whether 
current LOAC rules adequately regulate cyber war: those that 
believe that current LOAC rules can adequately address cyber 
war and those that believe new treaties will be necessary to 
regulate it effectively.120 Governments, by and large, have argued 
that new rules are not necessary to regulate cyber war.121 To 
determine whether current LOAC rules adequately regulate 
cyber war, one must first ask what the purposes of the applicable 
rules are. If the rules, as applied to Stuxnet, accomplish those 
policy objectives, then Stuxnet represents one piece of evidence 
that current LOAC paradigms adequately regulate cyber war. 
There are two primary policy purposes behind all jus in bello 
rules. First, the LOAC aims to lower the level of violence that 
occurs during an armed conflict. 122  This is most easily 
                                                                                                             
Convention, supra note 109; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Second 
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]. 
118. See, e.g., JOHN BRUNNER, THE SHOCKWAVE RIDER (1975) (describing how a 
computer worm—called a “tapeworm” in the novel—is used to alter data kept by a 
government entity). 
119. See, e.g., Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public 
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 274 (1996); Schmitt, supra note 21. 
120. See supra note 22 (comparing two differing positions on the adequacy of 
current LOAC rules). 
121. See Schaap, supra note 19, at 124 (stating that governments have “resisted 
calls to craft new rules of international law to govern attacks on or by computers”); 
Duncan B. Hollis, Rules of Cyberwar?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8. 2007, at A15 (noting 
government hesitancy to design new rules to regulate cyber war). 
122. See I MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING 
MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN HUMANITARIAN LAW 81–82 (2d ed. 2006) 
(noting that a goal of the LOAC is “limiting the violence” of the armed conflict); 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. 
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demonstrated in rules that “prohibit [the] use of particular 
weapons or forbid the creation of unnecessary suffering.”123 
Second, the LOAC attempts to protect individuals who are not 
participating in the conflict from suffering physical harm or 
damage to their property. 124  Part III of this Note explores 
whether the LOAC furthers these objectives when applied to 
Stuxnet. 
A. History of the LOAC 
Throughout the majority of history, war was mostly devoid 
of formal rules regulating the conduct of participants.125 There 
is evidence, however, that some ancient civilizations regulated 
combatants’ actions on the battlefield and their treatment of 
non-combatants and prisoners to some extent.126 Most of these 
rules stemmed from religious principles that called for 
compassion in certain situations. 127  Compared with the 
explosion of LOAC rules in recent centuries, however, these 
rules were sparse.128 
The 1862 book, A Memory of Solferino (“Memory”), written by 
the Swiss businessman Henri Dunant, is cited as the intellectual 
birth of the modern LOAC.129 After witnessing more than 40,000 
                                                                                                             
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 145 (1999) (“The first [LOAC goal] is a desire to ratchet down 
the level of violence that occurs in armed conflict . . . .”). 
123. Schmitt, supra note 122, at 145. 
124. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that the LOAC is necessary to 
protect the potential civilian victims of war, as well as wounded, sick, or prisoner 
combatants); Schmitt, supra note 122, at 145 (stating that the LOAC’s second purpose 
is to “shield those who are not directly participating in the conflict from its effects”). 
125. See INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 151 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing early war 
rules and noting that victors in a war typically used “barbaric practices”). 
126. See id. (noting the Egyptians had agreements regarding the treatment of 
prisoners of war); GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH (forthcoming May 2012) (manuscript ch. 2, at 2–3) (noting 
that the “Just War” theory used by Christians in the Roman Empire had beneficial 
effects on the practice of war, at least when both sides were Christian). 
127. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 2–3 (discussing religious belief as a 
basis for early laws regulating war). 
128. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 39 (explaining that, as time passed, the 
number of LOAC regulations increased); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 3 
(noting the lack of a “comprehensive set of guidelines” prior to the 18th century). 
129. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 111, at 1168 (noting that the law began developing 
in the middle of the nineteenth century thanks to Henri Dunant’s writing); CORN ET 
AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 4 (crediting Dunant’s writing as the impetus for the First 
Geneva Convention). 
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wounded soldiers left to die after a massive battle between 
Austrian, French, and Sardinian forces, Dunant wrote Memory in 
an attempt to advocate for the formation of some inviolate 
“international principle” that would give legal protection to 
wounded military personnel.130 Dunant’s proposals eventually 
prompted the formation of the First Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in the 
Field, which provided certain forms of protection to soldiers 
injured in battle.131 
The LOAC continued to grow during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, most notably through treaties. The Hague 
Conventions of 1907 created laws regulating the means and 
methods of war, while the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
expanded on principles designed to protect individuals not 
participating in the hostilities. 132  In 1977, the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (“AP I”) supplemented existing regulations under the 
Geneva Conventions.133 AP I updated principles limiting the 
means and methods of war for parties to an armed conflict.134 It 
also codified principles that limited attacks to military 
objectives.135 
                                                                                                             
130. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 37–38 (depicting how Dunant witnessed 
40,000 wounded soldiers left to die on the battlefield after the battle of Solferino); 
CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 4 (stating that witnessing these horrors inspired 
Dunant to write A Memory of Solferino). 
131. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 1168 (commenting that as a result of Dunant’s 
writing, the First Geneva Convention was adopted); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, at 4 
(“[Dunant’s] suggestions were taken up by others, and led to the formation of . . . the 
first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field, which among other things provided for use of the red cross symbol 
to distinguish hospitals, ambulances and evacuation parties.”). 
132. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, supra note 117, art. 23(e) (prohibiting 
weapons “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”); Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 117, art. 3(1) (stating that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the 
hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”). 
133. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 1(3) (stating that the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (“AP I”) supplements the Geneva Conventions and 
applies in the same circumstances). 
134. See, e.g., id. art. 57(2) (articulating the principle of proportionality). 
135. See id. art. 48 (“Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objectives and military 
objectives . . . .”). 
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B. LOAC Sources 
International law can be found in several different sources 
that are enumerated in Article 38(1) of the International Court 
of Justice statute, which is recognized as the definitive statement 
on the sources of international law.136 As defined in the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, these sources are: (1) 
international treaties, (2) customary international law, (3) 
general principles of law, and (4) judicial decisions and 
publications.137 The remainder of this Section focuses on treaties 
and customary law, as cyber war principles are predominantly 
drawn from these sources. 
1. Treaties 
Treaties are written agreements through which nations 
legally bind themselves to behave in a particular way. 138 
Although a comparatively modern method for creating LOAC 
rules, the number of LOAC treaties has exploded over the last 
century, making treaties one of the first places to find the 
LOAC.139 Some scholars consider treaties to be superior to other 
sources of international law, including customary law, because 
they reflect the express consent of the treaty signatories.140 
                                                                                                             
136. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (7th ed. 
2008) (noting that Article 38 is “regarded as a “complete statement of the sources of 
international law”); see also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 55 (beginning an 
explanation of the sources of international law with Article 38). 
137. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
138. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 13 (stating that treaties are binding on 
parties to them). 
139. See DETTER, supra note 125, at 151–52 (explaining that although seventeenth 
century treaties regulating armed conflict exist, prohibitions on the use of force date 
back to 1400 BC); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 2–6 (citing the existence of the 
LOAC “since antiquity”); see also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 1277 (noting the 
importance of Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols and 
stating that the treaties have received “widespread multilateral adherence”); KOLB & 
HYDE, supra note 110, at 40–41 (positing that important recent developments in the law 
of conflict are the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols, 
all of which are treaties). 
140. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 111, at 94 (“For many writers, treaties constitute 
the most important sources of international law . . . .”); Juliana Murray, Assessing 
Allegations: Judicial Evaluation of Testimonial Evidence in International Tribunals, 10 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 769, 771 (2010) (“Treaties are also widely recognized by scholars as a valid 
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Only nations that are parties to a particular treaty are 
bound by the treaty itself. 141  In addition to creating law, 
however, treaties are also capable of codifying existing law.142 
Courts may therefore look to treaties to express principles of 
customary law that are applicable to states not party to the treaty 
in question.143 As explained below, this is particularly important 
to Israel and the United States, who are not parties to AP I, one 
of the more important post-World War II treaties.144 
2. Custom 
Customary law is an important source of the LOAC.145 In 
fact, without a treaty on point, customary law is frequently the 
only source of law that addresses a particular LOAC topic.146 For 
a rule of law to apply to states through “international custom,” 
the behavior must be a “practice accepted as law.”147 Customary 
law therefore has two requirements: (1) demonstrated state 
                                                                                                             
source of international law that may in some circumstances be superior to custom, 
when treaties can more clearly reflect the parties’ specific intentions.”). 
141. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 13 (“[T]reaties are in principle binding 
only on parties.”); SHAW, supra note 111, at 95 (explaining that treaties create rules that 
are binding upon the parties). 
142. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 124 (noting that the Vienna 
Convention was invoked even prior to its entry into force because it was “largely 
declaratory of customary international law”); SHAW, supra note 111, at 95 (“[W]here 
treaties reflect customary law then non-parties are bound, not because it is a treaty 
provision but because it reaffirms a rule or rules of customary international law.”). 
143. See Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the 
Charming Betsy Cannon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784, 1798 (2011) (explaining that US courts 
often look to treaties as evidence of customary law regardless of whether the United 
States is a party to the treaty); Eric W. Sievers, Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse 
Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (2002) (stating that 
customary law “can be gleaned from a variety of sources,” including treaties). 
144. See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 430 (2011) (noting that 
Israel and the United States continue their refusal to ratify AP I); List of Signatories to AP 
I, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/WebSign?
ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (indicating that Israel and the 
United States are not parties to AP I). AP I is particularly important to this Note 
because it codifies the principles of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality. 
145. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 51 (explaining that customary law is one 
of the main sources of the LOAC); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 18 (stating 
that customary law is an “important source of the [LOAC]”). 
146. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 18 (stating that customary law “may 
be the only source” of law on a particular LOAC topic). 
147. ICJ Statute, supra note 137, art. 38(1)(b). 
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practice, and (2) a subjective belief by the state that they are 
under a duty of law to follow the state practice.148 That a state 
behaves in a particular way is therefore not sufficient to form 
customary international law; there must also be a subjective 
belief, termed opinio juris, on the part of the state that they had a 
legal duty to behave that way.149  
For a custom to constitute “state practice,” it must be of 
sufficient (1) duration, (2) uniformity, and (3) generality 
amongst the states.150 There is no specific length of time that a 
practice must have existed for there to be sufficient duration.151 
Frequently, the length of time depends upon the type of 
practice in question.152 In more modern or dynamic fields, rules 
can develop quickly. 153  In more established fields of law, 
customary law is slower to develop.154 The custom need not be 
followed without fail, but needs to be of a consistent nature 
                                                                                                             
148 . See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (breaking “practice” down into 
elements of duration, uniformity, and generality, and describing opinio juris as a 
separate and necessary element of international custom); DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 
111, at 59 (explaining that custom has “two distinct elements: (1) ‘general practice’ 
and (2) its acceptance as law [i.e. opinio juris]”). 
149. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 59 (noting the opinio juris element of 
customary law); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 19 (“Thus, the mere fact that 
States may engage in a practice (or not engage in a practice) is not enough to indicate 
that it required as a matter of customary law. States also must consider the practice or 
its omission to be a legal requirement.”). 
150. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (breaking the “state practice” 
requirement into duration, uniformity, and generality of the practice); Anguel 
Anastassov, Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role of Public International Law and the 
International Court of Justice, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 65, 79 (2010) (noting the general 
criteria for “state practice” is duration, uniformity, and generality). 
151. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 76 (stating that the time necessary can vary from 
“time immemorial” to a matter of decades). 
152. Compare SHAW, supra note 111, at 78 (stating that the law on airspace 
developed quickly following the invention of manned aircraft), with Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677, 686–700 (1900) (analyzing examples of state practice as far back as 1403 
in an effort to establish state practice for customary laws regulating civilian fishing 
boats during a time of war). 
153. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7 (“[R]ules relating to airspace and the 
continental shelf have emerged from fairly quick maturing of practice.”). See generally 
Benjamin Langille, Note, It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145 (2003) (arguing 
that “instant custom” formed in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon). 
154. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686–700 (examining 600 years of history 
to establish customary law in regards to fishermen). 
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throughout the history of the practice.155 Finally, the practice 
must be “widespread and representative” to satisfy the 
“generality” requirement.156 Once the “state practice” element is 
established, courts examine the lens through which the state 
views its own behavior. The practice will only constitute 
customary law if the state also satisfies the opinio juris 
requirement.157 
C. Relevant LOAC Principles 
There are two cardinal principles of the LOAC: military 
necessity and humanity.158 The principle of military necessity is 
articulated in the preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration—
the first formal agreement prohibiting the use of certain 
weapons in war—which states, “the only legitimate object which 
States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken 
the military forces of the enemy.”159 The principle is further 
illuminated in the United States Air Force manual, which states 
that military necessity has four basic elements: (1) that force is 
regulated; (2) that force is necessary to achieve as quickly as 
possible the partial or complete submission of the adversary; 
(3) that the force is no greater than needed to achieve this; and 
(4) that it is not otherwise prohibited.160 The principle therefore 
requires that a belligerent use only such force as is necessary to 
overpower the enemy and result in the enemy’s surrender.161 
                                                                                                             
155. See id. at 689 (noting that the practice had been violated by the French in a 
few instances); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) (“It is not to be expected that in the practice of 
States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect . . . .”). 
156. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 73 
(Feb. 20). 
157. See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7) 
(noting that only if the state was “conscious of a duty” could there be customary 
international law); BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (describing opinio juris as a 
necessary element of international custom). 
158. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4. 
159. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil 
(ser. 1) 474, translated and reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101, 102 
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988). 
160. U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, AFP 110-31, at 1-5 to 1-6 
(1976). 
161. See T.E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 12 (1908) (stating that only 
actions indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy are permitting under 
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The principle of humanity places a prohibition upon 
undertakings that might otherwise be justified under only the 
principle of military necessity.162 
These two cardinal principles provide the foundation from 
which all LOAC rules are drawn. The principles are somewhat 
abstract in nature, however, and require additional principles to 
more effectively “implement” the twin goals of military necessity 
and humanity.163 The primary implementation principles for 
military necessity are the principles of distinction and 
proportionality.164 Similar to, but conceptually different from, 
the principle of distinction, is the implementing principle of 
“discrimination.”165 These principles are described more fully in 
Part II.C.1–3 below. The implementation principles for 
“humanity” are the principles of “humane treatment and the 
prohibition against the infliction of unnecessary suffering.”166 
This Note focuses on the principles of distinction, 
discrimination, and proportionality.167 A fact-sensitive inquiry is 
required to determine whether Stuxnet violated these principles 
and whether Stuxnet was properly regulated. While humane 
treatment and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering are 
obviously relevant to cyber law—it is possible that a cyber attack 
                                                                                                             
the principle of military necessity); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 8 (“Military 
necessity supplies the authority to employ the means necessary to bring an enemy to 
submission.”). 
162. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7 (2d ed. 2004) (“Humanity is, 
therefore, a guiding principle that puts a brake on undertakings which might otherwise 
be justified by the principle of military necessity.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, 
at 9 (“[A]uthority derived from the contemporary principle of military necessity is not 
absolute, but is instead qualified by humanitarian obligations.”). 
163. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 46–47 (noting that beneath the 
principles of military necessity and humanity are “a series of more concrete and 
operational principles”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 11 (describing the 
necessity of these “implementing principles”). 
164. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4 (“Complementing the principle of 
military necessity are the principles of military objective and proportionality.”). 
165. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the principle of discrimination). 
166. CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4. 
167. For a similar analysis of the targetability of the Natanz facility under the 
principle of distinction, see generally Brian L. Bengs, Legal Constraints upon the Use of a 
Tactical Nuclear Weapon Against the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 323 (2008). 
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could cause physical harm to humans—Stuxnet injured no one 
and therefore does not violate either principle.168 
Part III of this Note hypothetically applies these principles 
to Israel and the United States, so it is also necessary to briefly 
discuss how the rules apply to those countries. As the following 
Sections explain, all three principles constitute “customary 
international law” that are also codified in AP I.169 Although 
neither Israel nor the United States has ratified AP I, distinction, 
discrimination, and proportionality are widely recognized as 
principles of customary law with AP I merely “restating” the 
rule.170 The principles are therefore applicable to all states, even 
those that never properly ratified the Geneva Convention. Thus, 
Israel and the United States are legally bound to follow these 
principles. 
1. Distinction 
The basic premise of distinction is described in Article 48 of 
AP I, which states: “Parties to [a] conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”171 
Distinction therefore has two primary elements: (1) combatants 
must distinguish military individuals, items, and objectives from 
civilians and civilian property, and (2) once this distinction has 
been made, commanders must direct their operations only 
                                                                                                             
168. See supra Part I.D–E (describing the effects of Stuxnet and highlighting the 
lack of physical injury). 
169. See infra Part II.C.1–3. 
170. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks 
at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on 
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and 
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 419, 422–29 (1987) (explaining the articles of AP I that the United States 
considers customary law and therefore is bound to follow); Matthew D. Thurlow, Note, 
Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International 
Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 155 (2005) (noting that the United States is 
bound by customary law and that AP I codifies customary law); supra note 144 and 
accompanying text (indicating that Israel and the United States are not parties to AP 
I). 
171. AP I, supra note 117, art. 48. 
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against combatants and military objectives.172 The rule therefore 
provides a workable means for commanders to implement the 
principle of necessity.173 
Distinction can be further broken down into two parallel 
but distinct aspects: first, distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants, and second, distinguishing between military objects 
and civilian property. The first aspect of distinction is 
inapplicable to Stuxnet because no persons were targeted by the 
attack.174 The second aspect of distinction applies to Stuxnet 
because the worm targeted physical objects. 175  This Section 
therefore addresses only the second aspect of distinction. 
While Article 48 of AP I states the basic rule of distinction, 
Articles 49 through 56 articulate more specific rules used in its 
application.176 The prohibition against attacking civilian objects 
is described in Article 52(1) of AP I: “[C]ivilian objects shall not 
be the object of attack or reprisals.”177 It further defines “civilian 
objects” as “all objects which are not military objectives.”178 One 
must therefore determine whether an object is a “military 
objective” to determine if it is a valid target. 
The test for whether an object or facility is a targetable 
“military objective” is (1) whether the object makes an effective 
military contribution, and (2) whether targeting that object 
results in a definite military advantage.179 These elements are 
                                                                                                             
172. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & 
POL’Y 87, 98 (2010) (“‘Distinction’ . . . requires that combatants be distinguished from 
noncombatants and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property 
or protected places.”); see also ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (“[W]ar is to be waged 
against the enemy’s armed forces, not against its civilian population. Attacks are to be 
directed at military targets, not at civilian objects.”) 
173. See ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (noting that the principle of distinction 
follows from the principle of necessity); see also KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 125 
(“Underlying [the rule of distinction] is the principle that, even in an armed conflict, 
the only legitimate military action is that which is aimed at weakening the military 
potential of the enemy.”). 
174. See supra Part I.D–E (noting that Stuxnet harmed only property). 
175. See supra Part I.D–E (describing the impact of Stuxnet on the Iranian nuclear 
program and on computers worldwide). 
176. See AP I, supra note 117, arts. 49–56. 
177. Id. art. 52(1). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. art. 52(2); see KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 125 (bifurcating the 
“military objective” analysis into whether the target makes an effective military 
contribution and whether the planned attack results in a military advantage). 
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determined by considering the object’s “nature, location, 
purpose or use.” 180  The AP I commentary explains that 
“potential or indeterminate advantages” do not meet the 
standard for a “definite” military advantage.181 If the object does 
make an effective military contribution, usually discernable from 
the object’s purpose, and destroying or disabling that object 
results in a definite military advantage, then the object is 
targetable under the principle of distinction.182 If the object 
does not meet these criteria, then Article 52(3) creates a 
presumption that the object is civilian property and not a valid 
target.183 
The fact that an installation is not technically considered 
part of the military does not mean that it cannot lawfully be 
targeted; if the target makes a military contribution and its 
destruction would result in a definite military advantage, then 
the facility is legally targetable despite its official designation as a 
nonmilitary structure.184 For example, munitions plants always 
have been an acceptable target under the principle of 
distinction regardless of whether they were controlled by the 
military or by civilians.185 Facilities with dual purposes, such as 
power plants that service both civilian and military installations, 
also may be an acceptable target under the principle of 
distinction.186 
The amorphousness of the test for what constitutes a valid 
“military objective” renders few examples of targets that will be 
                                                                                                             
180. AP I, supra note 117, art. 52(2). 
181. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 636 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP I COMMENTARY]. 
182. AP I, supra note 117, art. 52. 
183. Id. art. 52(3) (stating that in cases of doubt, commanders should presume 
that the target is civilian property). 
184. See id. art. 52 (lacking any language indicating that an object’s “official” 
status as nonmilitary has any bearing on the distinction analysis). 
185. See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 162, at 18 (explaining that a munitions factory is 
so important that the death of most civilians working there is not disproportionate); 
Kenneth B. Brown, Counter-Guerilla Operations: Does the Law of War Proscribe Success?, 44 
NAVAL L. REV. 123, 155 n.140 (1997) (noting that even if civilians were killed in an 
attack on a munitions plant it would not necessarily violate the LOAC). 
186. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD T. REYNOLDS, HEART OF THE STORM: THE GENESIS OF THE 
AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ 54 (1995) (stating that power plants were frequently 
targeted by the US military during the Gulf War). 
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valid in all situations.187 Commentators have noted that the 
increased reliance of militaries upon a state’s industrial facilities 
has made the distinction between civilian and military objects 
less well-defined and, perhaps, less important.188 Even during 
the height of World War II, military leaders still espoused the 
principle of distinction as important; in 1938, British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain stated to the House of Commons 
that “targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate 
military objectives and must be capable of identification.”189 The 
view that distinction is no longer valid law also fundamentally 
confuses the existence of the principle with its efficacy; just as 
individuals break criminal laws, nations can violate established 
LOAC principles without destroying the rule itself.190 Despite the 
alleged decline in importance of the rule of distinction, the 
principle remains a fundamental part of the LOAC. 
For a commander to be in compliance with the principle of 
distinction and Article 48 of AP I, he does not need to be 
“correct” in his decision about the site’s targetability; he need 
only take “reasonable precautions” in reaching his decision that 
the target is legal.191 He also must do “everything feasible” to 
verify that the target is not a civilian object and he must take “all 
feasible precautions” in choosing the means and methods of 
attack in order to minimize or avoid damage to civilian 
                                                                                                             
187. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 130 (“The modern LOAC has abandoned 
any attempt to provide a list of [objects that are military objectives], even a non-
exhaustive, illustrative one.”); AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 1997–99 (noting 
that lawmakers’ attempts to create a list of targets that constitute “military objectives” 
were unsuccessful). 
188. Mika Nishimura Hayashi, The Principle of Civilian Protection and Contemporary 
Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CONSTRAINTS ON THE CONTEMPORARY 
USE OF MILITARY FORCE 105, 109 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2005) (“According to this 
view, practice in the two World Wars altered the legal status of the principle of 
distinction from a time-honored principle of the [LOAC] to a legally meaningless 
expression.”); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 13 (citing the practice during World War II 
of bombing civilian centers of population). 
189. 337 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1938) 937 (U.K.). 
190. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 6 (“[J]ust as incidents of murder, robbery and 
rape do occur within national legal orders without destroying the system as such, so 
analogously assaults upon international legal rules point up the weaknesses of the 
system without denigrating their validity or their necessity.”); Hayashi, supra note 188, 
at 112 (noting the “vigorous defense” of the principle of distinction following World 
War II). 
191. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(4). 
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objects. 192  “Feasibility” takes into consideration the 
circumstances in which the commander is making the 
determination.193 
2. Discrimination 
Discrimination is a principle related to, but conceptually 
different from, distinction. Article 51(4) of AP I outlines the 
principle of discrimination: states must not only distinguish 
between targets that are civilian and those that are legitimate 
military objectives, but must also use weapons that are capable of 
being “directed at a specific military objective.”194 Thus, if a 
weapon were to be faithfully aimed at an appropriate target, but 
physically was incapable of controlling the force released to a 
designated physical area, the weapon would violate the principle 
of discrimination.195 Examples of weapons that might violate the 
principle are “long-range missile[s] with no, or only a 
rudimentary, guidance system . . . [or] biological weapons that 
spread contagious diseases.”196 
If a commander reasonably anticipates that the weapon will 
be able to properly “discriminate,” then they are in compliance 
with the rule. A hypothetical example is a weapon that is 
typically able to focus on a target, but malfunctions and causes 
damage to surrounding areas; a commander would not violate 
the principle of discrimination if he had taken “reasonable 
precautions” to ensure that the weapon was capable of 
discriminating, even though in this instance it did not.197 The 
“feasibility” standard described in the preceding Section applies 
to the amount of information a commander must gather before 
                                                                                                             
192. Id. art. 57(2). 
193. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1184 (stating that rules will be applied to 
situations as they appeared to commanders at the time of the decision). 
194. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(4). 
195. See DETTER, supra note 125, at 235 (noting that nuclear weapons may violate 
the principle of discrimination because they are, by nature, incapable of confining 
their destructive forces); KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 136 (“[I]t is prohibited to 
use weapons that cannot be specifically targeted at military objectives because their 
action is inherently indiscriminate.”). 
196. Schmitt, supra note 122, at 147. 
197. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(4). 
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he may make his determination on the legality of the strike 
under the principle of discrimination, as well.198 
Also relevant to an application of discrimination to cyber 
weapons is the possible existence of knock-on effects. Knock-on 
effects are consequences from an attack that a commander did 
not intend or plan to occur.199 They happen because of the 
existence of an “unexpected agent or circumstance.”200 Whether 
knock-on effects cause an attack to be unlawful does not depend 
upon the damage actually done by the weapon; instead, it turns 
on whether the commander has “taken sufficient precautions 
. . . [to ensure] that his attack does not go beyond its intended 
target.”201 
Professor Michael Schmitt has argued that if a virus or 
worm has “no way to limit its subsequent retransmission” then it 
is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon. 202  An important 
question is how certain a commander must be that knock-on 
effects will not render his “weapon” indiscriminate before he 
can lawfully deploy the weapon.203 Article 51 states that the 
standard is what is “expected.”204 This would appear to give 
military commanders broad discretion in determining whether 
knock-on effects render an attack unlawful.205 Furthermore, the 
commentary states that commander’s expectations will be valid 
if they were made in “common sense and good faith.”206 With 
respect to CNAs, commanders have stated that it is US policy to 
determine whether the malware does “exactly” what it is 
intended to do without any “unintended consequences.”207 
                                                                                                             
198. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2); see also supra notes 192–93 and 
accompanying text (describing the feasibility standard and its application to 
distinction). 
199. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 (defining knock-on effects). 
200. Id. at 1177. 
201. Id. at 1178. 
202. Schmitt, supra note 21, at 389. 
203. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1179–86 (examining various possible standards 
of certainty for commanders in these analyses); see also AP I, supra note 117, 
art. 51(5)(b). 
204. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(5)(b). 
205. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 2209–10 (stating that the standard 
gives a “fairly broad margin of judgment” to commanders). 
206. Id. at 2208. 
207. Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 n.12. 
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3. Proportionality 
Commentators recognize that the principle of distinction is 
inadequate protection for civilians and civilian property in an 
armed conflict. 208  Without another rule, one could justify 
massive damage to civilians and civilian property simply by 
selecting an otherwise valid military target.209 Proportionality, in 
conjunction with distinction, is the LOAC principle designed to 
protect civilians and civilian objects from harm through 
unnecessary “collateral damage.”210 While distinction attempts 
to prevent the targeting of civilians or civilian objects and 
discrimination attempts to prevent the use of weapons that 
cannot successfully focus on military targets, proportionality 
regulates attacks in which damage to civilian property is a 
foreseeable result of an attack on a valid military objective.211 
Proportionality, therefore, sets a limit on what amount of 
collateral destruction of civilian property, or death and injury to 
civilians, is allowable when attacking an otherwise-permissible 
military target. 212  Article 57(2) of AP I mandates that the 
                                                                                                             
208. See ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that additional principles put a 
“brake” on attacks that would otherwise be permissible under the principle of military 
necessity); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 8 (noting that further regulations 
complement the principle of military necessity). 
209. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 15 (“Determining that a person, 
place, or thing qualifies as a lawful object of attack does not however categorically 
establish the legality of attack.”); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting 
that implementing rules for the principle of humanity put further restrictions on 
military attacks). 
210. Amnon Rubinstein, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a 
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 100 (2011) (“[T]he principle 
of proportionality entails a duty on the military commander to assess the attack’s 
collateral damage . . . .”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 15 (explaining that 
proportionality requires commanders to consider the “collateral damage” of their 
attacks). 
211. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1170–71 (“Even if the target is legitimate, the 
attacker is required to adjust his means and methods of attack so that the destruction 
or death of the target does not include or cause a chain of events that will lead to the 
death of civilians or destruction of civilian property that is excessive to the concrete and 
direct military advantage to be gained.”); Schmitt, supra note 122, at 150 
(“[P]roportionality operates in scenarios in which incidental injury and collateral 
damage are the foreseeable, albeit undesired, result of attack on a legitimate target.”). 
212. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2)(b) (“An attack shall be cancelled or 
suspended if it . . . may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”); 
Rebecca J. Barber, The Proportionality Equation: Balancing Military Objectives with Civilian 
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anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to 
attacks must not be “excessive” in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage expected to be gained.213 Article 51(5) 
also states that an attack will violate the LOAC if the collateral 
damage is “excessive” when compared to the advantage 
gained. 214  Since combatants and military objectives are 
legitimate targets, loss of combatant’s lives or damage to military 
objectives is not considered in the “proportionality equation.”215 
Commanders are not required to have calculated this 
proportionality equation correctly ex post facto; the analysis is 
applied with the information available at the time of the 
attack.216 The circumstances of the decision, such as the amount 
of time a commander has to make the decision and the amount 
of information reasonably obtainable, are considered.217 
To weigh the military advantage gained against the loss of 
civilian life and property, one must first define what constitutes a 
military advantage. To confer any military advantage, the target 
must first have been deemed a valid “military objective” under 
                                                                                                             
Lives in the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 476, 479 (2010) 
(“[I]n assessing proportionality, military commanders must attempt to weigh the 
expected loss of civilian life and/or damage to civilian property against the anticipated 
military advantage.”). 
213. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2) (stating that an attack shall be cancelled if 
it becomes apparent the collateral damage would be “excessive” when compared with 
the military advantage gained); JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND 
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 98 (2004) (noting that proportionality is designed to 
ensure incidental civilian damage is not “excessive”). 
214. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(5)(b). Note that Article 51 places this balancing 
test under the rubric of “discrimination,” conflating two conceptually different 
principles. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 94 (“The designation of proportionality as a 
species of indiscriminate attack confuses the idea of proportionality with the 
requirement to distinguish between civilian and military targets.”). 
215. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 14 (explaining that harm to combatants is 
considered under the principles of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and not 
proportionality); Jensen, supra note 22, at 1171 (“[T]he rule of proportionality only 
applies to civilians and civilian property. It is not an attempt to ensure a ‘fair fight’ 
between combatants.” (internal citations omitted)). 
216. See Barber, supra note 212, at 477 (“[I]t is important to note that 
commanders are not to be judged on the basis of an ex post facto assessment.”); Jensen, 
supra note 22, at 1183 (noting that courts examine a commander’s decisions as the 
situation appeared to the commander at the time). 
217. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing how the feasibility 
standard takes into consideration all the circumstances at the time of the decision). 
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the principle of distinction.218 Once the object is deemed a valid 
target, the most important factor considered is the effect 
destroying or incapacitating the target will have on 
accomplishing a military objective; the more essential the target 
is to accomplishing an objective, the more damage to civilian 
property will be tolerated. 219  “Military advantage” is further 
defined in the AP I Commentary as consisting of “ground 
gained and in annihilating or weakening the enemy armed 
forces.”220 The military advantage must also be “concrete and 
direct.”221 
Next, the amount of collateral damage the attack is 
expected to cause must be determined.222 Although AP I does 
not provide a list of factors that should be considered, there are 
some basic considerations that are likely applicable in most 
calculations. 223  The proximity of the target to civilians and 
civilian property, the density of the civilian population in the 
area, the timing of the attack, the possibility of the release of 
hazardous substances, and the ability of the weapon to target a 
specific physical area should be considered. 224  More 
fundamentally, human lives carry greater weight than physical 
property in the calculation.225 
The calculation commanders must make is a difficult one. 
How is one to weigh the value of accomplishing a military 
                                                                                                             
218. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 100 (arguing that the distinction analysis 
should occur prior to a proportionality analysis); see also Jensen, supra note 22, at 1170 
(noting that the proportionality analysis occurs “[o]nce a commander has determined 
that a target is a military objective”). 
219. GARDAM, supra note 213, at 100 (“The more integral the proposed target is 
to the military strategy, the higher the level of likely civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian objects that will be acceptable.”); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 21–22 (“Clearly, 
the more important the military objective, the greater the incidental losses before it 
could be said that the rule of proportionality had been violated.”). 
220. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 2218. 
221. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
222. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text (describing the two-part test). 
223. See generally AP I, supra note 117 (failing to list any specific factors). 
224. See GARDAM, supra note 217, at 103 (listing considerations for the civilian 
damage side of the proportionality equation); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 23 (noting 
factors that should be considered during proportionality analysis). 
225. See generally Barber, supra note 212 (noting that human lives are considered 
more valuable than physical property). 
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objective against the value of human life and property? 226 
Despite this difficulty, there is likely a consensus at the ends of 
the “proportionality continuum.”227 For example, it is likely that 
all governments would agree that a single injury to a civilian 
would not be excessive compared to capturing a high-ranking 
military commander, while neutralizing a single infantryman 
would not justify the deaths of thousands of civilians.228 The 
more difficult analysis, however, is in the middle of the 
continuum.229 
The existence of knock-on effects, discussed previously in 
Part II.C.2, is also relevant to a proportionality analysis.230 The 
legality of an attack under the principle of proportionality will 
turn on whether the commander has taken sufficient 
“precautions” to ensure that proportionality is not violated.”231 
Commanders are once again subject to Article 57(2)(b) of AP I, 
which applies an “expected” results test, as previously described 
under the principle of discrimination.232 The analysis for a CNA 
is greatly complicated by the possible presence of knock-on 
effects; the collateral damage to civilians will be clear in a kinetic 
attack but not in a CNA.233 
The principles of distinction, discrimination, and 
proportionality regulate combatants’ actions during an armed 
conflict. They exist to further the LOAC goals of reducing 
overall destruction in warfare, and reducing unnecessary harm 
to civilians and civilian property. The principles apply to CNAs, 
although not explicitly stated anywhere in the LOAC.234 
                                                                                                             
226. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 48 (stating that the military advantage 
gained and civilian losses must be put into “some form of balance,” but not specifying 
what form); Barber, supra note 212, at 476 (“[T]he considerations being weighed on 
each side—the value of human lives on the one hand, the value of a military objective 
on the other—are in many respects simply not amenable to comparison.”). 
227. See Schmitt, supra note 122, at 170. 
228. Id. 
229. See id. at 170 (“The complexity emerges when one moves from these 
extremes along the proportionality continuum toward the center.”) 
230. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (describing knock-on 
effects). 
231. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57. 
232. Id. art. 57(2)(b). 
233. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1178 (“[W]hen using kinetic weapons, 
determining, at least in the short term, what injury and damage will occur can be much 
clearer. This may not be so clear in relation to CNA.”). 
234. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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III. APPLICATION OF THE LOAC TO STUXNET 
The facts described in Part I.B–E support the conclusion 
that Stuxnet was developed by Israel and the United States to 
target Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. The high value of Stuxnet’s 
zero-day hacks, the discriminating nature of Stuxnet’s payload, 
the substantial budget required to create Stuxnet, and the 
suspicious reactions of Israeli and US officials demonstrate that 
they both likely played a role in Stuxnet’s development and 
deployment.235 This Note assumes that to be true. All other facts 
about Stuxnet, such as how the worm worked and the damage 
that it did to the nuclear installations, are analyzed based 
entirely on available evidence. 
Part III applies the principles of distinction, discrimination, 
and proportionality to the facts of Stuxnet. It argues that, with 
one exception, application of the LOAC to Stuxnet 
accomplishes the LOAC goals and that Stuxnet therefore 
represents one piece of evidence that current LOAC paradigms 
adequately regulate cyber war. Section A of this Part applies the 
principle of distinction to Stuxnet. Section B applies the 
principle of discrimination. Section C applies the principle of 
proportionality. 
This Note concludes that, as applied to Stuxnet, the US 
position that the LOAC adequately regulates cyber war is 
fundamentally correct: existing LOAC rules adequately address 
the issues Stuxnet raises. This is demonstrated in two ways. First, 
the fundamental policy goals behind the rules of the LOAC are 
furthered when applied to Stuxnet. Second, the LOAC has 
already accomplished some of these goals, namely that the 
programmers of Stuxnet appear to have specifically designed 
the worm to conform to the rules of the LOAC. 
A. Distinction Applied to Stuxnet 
The application of distinction to Stuxnet must come first 
because a determination that Natanz was not a valid military 
objective would render Stuxnet illegal, regardless of the worm’s 
adherence to the principles of discrimination and 
                                                                                                             
235. See supra Part I.B–E. 
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proportionality.236 It seems likely that the Natanz nuclear facility 
constitutes an appropriate military target under the principle of 
distinction. There are two possible purposes for the uranium 
enrichment at Natanz. First, Iran could enrich uranium as part 
of the creation of a nuclear weapon.237 The enriched uranium it 
produces is a necessary component of nuclear weapons.238 This 
would render Natanz a military target.239 
Alternatively, the centrifuges could be enriching uranium 
to fuel Iranian nuclear power plants, which would also render 
Natanz an acceptable military target.240 A power plant has the 
potential to power military structures. The power plant’s 
“purpose”—providing electricity to military operations—
certainly makes an effective “military contribution,” considering 
the power plant’s nature and function. 241  Disrupting power 
generation would likely result in a definite military advantage: 
military installations that would otherwise be operational would 
be incapacitated.242 A nuclear power plant therefore would be a 
valid military objective under Article 51(2). Logically, a facility 
that provides essential component parts to power plants—here, 
the enriched uranium—also would be a valid military objective. 
Therefore, a commander would be “reasonable” in determining 
that it was a permissible military target.243 
In simply “choosing” a target, there is no fundamental 
difference in distinction analysis between an attack on Natanz by 
traditional weapons or by Stuxnet. If, however, Stuxnet 
                                                                                                             
236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting that the determination of 
an object or individual as a valid military objective is the first step of any LOAC 
analysis). 
237. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining that there are some 
who believe Iran’s is enriching uranium to acquire a nuclear weapon). 
238. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating that enriched uranium is 
required for the development of a nuclear weapon). 
239. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (explaining that munitions plants 
are traditionally valid military objectives under the principle of distinction). 
240. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting that Iran claims its nuclear 
program is only for the purposes of generating nuclear power). 
241. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (stating that power plants 
have historically been valid targets under distinction and that analysis of whether an 
object is a valid military objective considers that object’s purpose). 
242. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (explaining that power plants have 
been considered valid military objectives in the past). 
243. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (describing the standard 
commanders will be held to when performing a distinction analysis). 
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intentionally infected civilian computers as a “stepping-stone” to 
infecting Natanz, those initial infections may have violated the 
principle of distinction. This would be true even if the civilian 
computers suffered no harm, so long as they were explicitly 
“targeted” by Stuxnet. Whether Stuxnet “targeted” these 
computers is therefore a crucial factor in determining whether 
Stuxnet violated the principle. In either scenario, however, the 
application of the principle to Stuxnet both lowers the level of 
overall destruction by requiring that the commander target only 
military objectives, such the Natanz facility, and also decreases 
the harm to civilians by requiring that the commander direct his 
attack at Natanz. Stuxnet is therefore properly regulated under 
the principle of distinction. 
B. Discrimination Applied to Stuxnet 
While Stuxnet’s attack on Natanz largely conforms to the 
principle of distinction, application of the principle of 
discrimination is substantially more difficult. The primary issue 
for Stuxnet is whether it is capable of discriminating between its 
target and things that “surround” it. 244  With a traditional 
weapon, this manifests itself in “collateral damage” to the 
physical area surrounding the target. 245  With Stuxnet, it 
manifests itself in potential damage to connected computers or 
computer networks.246 Professor Michael Schmitt, an authority 
on the law of cyber war, has argued that if a virus or worm 
cannot limit its transmission, then it may be prohibited as 
indiscriminate. 247  It seems, however, that there were some 
controls put onto Stuxnet in an effort to limit subsequent 
infections and direct its destructive effects solely at its intended 
target.248 
                                                                                                             
244. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (noting that weapons that are 
incapable of confining their force to military objectives may violate the principle of 
discrimination). 
245. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (stating that a missile fired without 
a guidance system would likely violate the principle of discrimination). 
246. See supra notes 98–102 (describing the effect of Stuxnet on computers 
outside of Natanz). 
247. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (describing Professor Michael 
Schmitt’s theory on indiscriminate malware transmission). 
248. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing the instructions 
Stuxnet’s creators put into its code to limit subsequent infections). 
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While Stuxnet closely controls the deployment of its 
payload, Stuxnet is fundamentally indiscriminate in that it does 
not distinguish among computers when spreading; it infects all 
of the computers using the Windows operating system that it 
can. 249  As stated previously, there have been over 100,000 
estimated infections worldwide. 250  Stuxnet’s programmers, 
however, designed the worm to only inflict damage upon the 
Iranian nuclear facilities.251 By creating a series of conditions 
that had to be fulfilled before Stuxnet’s payload would be 
delivered, the programmers essentially put a safety lid on an 
otherwise extremely dangerous weapon.252 As a result, despite 
the 100,000 infections, it appears that Stuxnet’s payload has 
never been deployed outside of the Iranian nuclear facilities.253 
Siemens, the company whose software and hardware Stuxnet 
targeted, has identified only twenty-four cases of infections at 
industrial plants worldwide.254 In each case, Stuxnet’s payload 
was not delivered and the company was able to detect the worm 
and remove it without harm to their computer system.255 Thus, 
in reality Stuxnet’s payload was deployed discriminately. 
The damage actually done by Stuxnet is not what must be 
considered when analyzing the principle of discrimination.256 
What is relevant are the results commanders “expected” at the 
time of deployment, and whether the commander in charge had 
done “everything feasible” to gather information prior to that 
deployment.257 Since there is no information available on the 
                                                                                                             
249. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing Stuxnet’s 
indiscriminate nature). 
250. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing a Symantec study 
tracking the number of Stuxnet infections). 
251. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing various limitations 
hindering Stuxnet’s proliferation). 
252. See supra notes 29–38 (describing the narrow circumstances in which 
Stuxnet’s payload will be deployed). 
253. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (stating that there has not been a 
recorded deployment of Stuxnet’s payload outside of Natanz). 
254. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (stating that a Siemens report 
identified twenty-four industrial infections). 
255. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the successful removal of 
Stuxnet from industrial hardware). 
256. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (explaining the standard to 
which commanders are held). 
257. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (describing the “expected 
results” and “everything feasible” standards of AP I). 
2012] EVOLVING BATTLEFIELDS 887 
process by which the American or Israeli commanders 
investigated the potential effects of Stuxnet’s payload, it is 
difficult to draw a firm conclusion about Stuxnet’s expected 
impact.258 Stuxnet’s code and its actual effects, however, can 
help us surmise what a commander would have known.259 
Stuxnet’s payload was unlikely to cause destruction outside 
of the Iranian nuclear facilities—or at least outside of the few 
facilities in the world that met the specific criteria required to 
activate Stuxnet’s payload.260 Stuxnet’s designers put a great 
amount of effort into ensuring only Natanz’s centrifuges would 
be struck by its payload.261 To develop such a highly specialized 
cyber weapon, the commanders must have done substantial 
investigation into whether Stuxnet’s payload was likely to be 
deployed on non-Natanz PLCs. 262  This means that the 
commander in charge likely satisfied the “everything feasible” 
investigation requirement, and acted in “good faith” when 
making the judgment that they “expected” Stuxnet to 
successfully discriminate.263 
It is also stated US policy to require commanders to fully 
investigate possible unintended consequences of malware.264 As 
such, it seems likely that at the time of deployment, a 
commander would have satisfied the requirement that he does 
everything feasible to determine the discriminatory nature of 
Stuxnet.265 After satisfying that requirement, it appears that the 
commander would have been reasonable in expecting Stuxnet 
                                                                                                             
258. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (stating that Stuxnet’s origins are 
currently unknown). 
259. See supra Part I.B–E (describing Stuxnet’s code and its effects). 
260. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text (noting that by programming 
Stuxnet’s payload to be delivered in such narrow circumstances, Stuxnet’s 
programmers rendered delivery of the payload outside of Natanz highly unlikely). 
261. See supra note 74–77 and accompanying text (noting the attention paid by 
Stuxnet’s programmers to ensuring Stuxnet’s payload was not discharged outside of 
Natanz). 
262. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (noting that US commanders are 
required to perform substantial investigations into knock-on effects). 
263. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (describing the standard to 
which commanders are held). 
264. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (stating that US commanders are 
required to make sure malware does “exactly” what it is supposed to). 
265. See supra note 191–93 and accompanying text (describing the feasibility 
standard). 
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to discriminate effectively between lawful military targets and 
prohibited ones, at least with regards to its payload.266 
Another issue is whether Stuxnet could be considered 
indiscriminate despite never deploying its payload outside of 
Natanz.267 Despite more than 100,000 infections, Stuxnet should 
not be considered indiscriminate under the LOAC. 268  The 
extent of the damage that the civilian computers suffered is 
unknown, but thought to be extremely minor. 269  Although 
civilians have struggled to completely rid their computers of 
Stuxnet, as have technicians at Natanz, the worm does not 
replicate indefinitely when it infects a computer.270 It therefore 
is incapable of “clogging” up a system as some worms can.271 A 
few lines of code sitting “inert” in a computer system are 
unlikely to cause any damage to a computer system.272 
Application of the principle of discrimination to Stuxnet 
demonstrates that Stuxnet successfully furthered LOAC policy 
goals.273 Although extremely effective, Stuxnet almost certainly 
would have had a better chance of destroying the centrifuges at 
Natanz if it had not been so discriminating. There was almost 
certainly a risk that the centrifuges that Stuxnet’s designers 
wished to destroy might not fall within the specific parameters 
Stuxnet required to deliver its payload. 274  If destroying the 
centrifuges was the only factor that Stuxnet’s designers 
considered, increasing the range of parameters necessary to 
                                                                                                             
266. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing the reasonableness 
standard). 
267. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining that Stuxnet’s payload 
has not been delivered outside of Natanz). 
268. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that Stuxnet has 
infected more than 100,000 computers) 
269. See supra Part I.D (describing Stuxnet’s negligible damage to civilian 
computers). 
270. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (noting the limitations 
Stuxnet’s code places on its ability to replicate). 
271. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing how a worm can harm 
computer networks despite the absence of a malicious payload). 
272. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing Stuxnet as an “inert 
feature” on the network when the parameters necessary to trigger its payload are not 
present). 
273. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the two primary 
LOAC policy objectives). 
274. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text (describing the “narrow” 
parameters in which Stuxnet’s payload would be deployed). 
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deliver Stuxnet’s payload would have been an easy way to 
accomplish that objective.275 The designers, however, did not do 
that. They gave up some operational effectiveness in return for 
assuring that PLCs other than those controlling the centrifuges 
would not be affected.276 This demonstrates that not only would 
the principle of discrimination theoretically further LOAC 
policy objectives, it likely already has furthered those 
objectives.277 The designers of Stuxnet obeyed the LOAC rules, 
even though jus in bello did not apply, and the policy objectives 
of the LOAC were furthered. The application of the principle of 
discrimination to Stuxnet assured that civilian objects were not 
harmed and that the overall level of destruction caused by the 
worm was minimalized. 
C. Proportionality Applied to Stuxnet 
In one respect, those who designed and deployed Stuxnet 
acted in strict conformity with the principle of proportionality; 
human lives are considered more valuable than physical 
property and Stuxnet avoided any civilian casualties.278 If the 
options being considered by Israel and the United States to 
delay the Iranian nuclear program were: (1) bomb the facility, 
or (2) use the Stuxnet worm, then Stuxnet was almost certainly 
less likely to violate the principle of proportionality than a 
kinetic attack.279 
Stuxnet enabled the commander in charge to target and 
destroy the uranium centrifuges with no loss of life and 
comparatively little damage to civilian objects.280 In comparison, 
Israel’s 2007 strike on Syria, which also targeted a nuclear facility 
buried underground, resulted in the physical destruction of the 
                                                                                                             
275. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (suggesting that Stuxnet’s 
designers considered factors other than its operational effectiveness). 
276. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet’s payload has 
not been deployed outside of Natanz). 
277. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the LOAC policy 
goals). 
278. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining that civilian lives are 
given greater weight in the proportionality analysis than civilian property). 
279. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing the massive 
property damage that occurred when Israel struck a Syrian nuclear facility). 
280. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet caused 
minimal damage to civilian property). 
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entire site.281 While wholesale destruction previously may have 
been the only way to accomplish a valid military objective, now a 
commander may be able to simply “turn off” an enemy facility. 
Stuxnet seems to follow this logic, although the centrifuges were 
not simply “turned off” and instead were destroyed in a manner 
similar to a traditional kinetic attack.282 
In fact, without considering knock-on effects, it seems 
extremely unlikely that Stuxnet violated the principle of 
proportionality. The centrifuges and PLCs were both lawful 
military targets under the principle of distinction, so without the 
subsequent delivery of Stuxnet’s payload to civilian computers, 
there would be almost no way for the principle to be violated, 
simply because there was no collateral damage.283 
Civilian computers were infected subsequently, however, 
and it was certainly foreseeable, so one must consider whether 
the infections constitute a violation of the principle of 
proportionality.284 To do so, one must first ask exactly what 
military advantage was gained by deploying Stuxnet.285 As stated 
above, Stuxnet destroyed almost 1000 centrifuges. 286  The 
damage was extensive and multifaceted. 287  While Israel’s 
government has previously said Iran was on the brink of 
acquiring nuclear weapons, the country’s outgoing intelligence 
chief estimated recently that Iran could not obtain nuclear 
weapons before 2015.288 If that is true, the military advantage 
gained is significant. 
                                                                                                             
281. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing Israel’s attack on a 
Syrian nuclear site). 
282. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing how Stuxnet 
destroyed centrifuges at Natanz). 
283. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that determining that 
the target is a valid military objective is the first step of the analysis). 
284. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting more than 100,000 civilian 
computer infections). 
285. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that analyzing the 
military advantage gained by the attack is the first step of the proportionality test). 
286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (stating that the Iranian 
government removed 984 centrifuges from Natanz). 
287. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (explaining the numerous ways 
in which Stuxnet may have damaged the Iranian nuclear program). 
288. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that Israeli officials now 
estimate that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon until 2015). 
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The second part of the test requires assessment of the 
collateral damage inflicted on civilians and civilian objects.289 As 
stated above, the actual damage to civilian computers appears 
minimal: the payload was never delivered to civilian computers; 
the “inert” worm caused little to no damage to civilian 
computers; and the worm has a “self-destruct” deadline that is 
rapidly approaching. 290  The military advantage gained by 
deploying Stuxnet—setting back Iran’s nuclear program several 
years—was significantly greater than the harm to civilian objects. 
API Article 57(2) requires that the damage to civilian objects be 
excessive when compared with the military advantage gained; 
Stuxnet was not excessive since essentially no damage was done 
to civilian computers and the military advantage was so great.291 
In fact, as far as its actual effects are considered, Stuxnet is at the 
end of the “proportionality continuum,” in which a broad 
consensus would exist that it did not violate the principle.292 It is 
not the actual effects of the worm, however, that must be 
analyzed; the relevant issues are what results commanders 
“expected” at the time of deployment.293 Given the minimal 
amount of collateral damage caused by Stuxnet, Stuxnet’s 
commanders were almost certainly reasonable in their 
calculations.294 This is not conclusive, however: should further 
analysis reveal that a common circumstance exists where 
Stuxnet’s payload deployment parameters are met, and it was 
simply fortunate that Stuxnet never encountered this 
circumstance, the commander’s reasonability could be 
questioned. 
Analysis of knock-on effects will also be similar to the 
analysis of the distinction principle in Part III.A. The test is 
                                                                                                             
289. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text (listing factors used during 
the evaluation of collateral damage in the proportionality equation). 
290. See supra notes 74, 100–02 and accompanying text (describing the self-
destruct deadline, the absence of payload deployment, and the lack of damage done to 
civilian computers).  
291. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting the “excessive” 
requirement in the proportionality test). 
292. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text (describing the 
“proportionality continuum”). 
293. See supra notes 192–93, 204 and accompanying text (explaining the 
“expected results” and “everything feasible” standards of AP I). 
294. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing the reasonableness 
standard). 
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whether a “reasonable” commander would have thought the 
attack conformed to the principle of proportionality, given that 
he took all “feasible” steps to obtain relevant information under 
the circumstances.295 Again, while it is impossible to know what 
steps were taken, circumstantial evidence points strongly toward 
the conclusion that American and Israeli commanders took 
great care to limit any possible unintended consequences of the 
worm. Stuxnet’s self-destruct instructions, limits on self-
replication, and specific requirements for deployment of its 
payload all support the conclusion that it was objectively 
reasonable to believe that Stuxnet would pass the 
proportionality test. 
The application of the proportionality principle to Stuxnet 
also furthers the policy goals of the LOAC.296 Complying with 
the principle of proportionality required the developers of the 
worm to carefully program it so that any harm to civilian 
computers would not be excessive.297 This lessened the impact of 
the attack on civilians. As noted in the analysis of discrimination 
in Part III.B, commanders could have ensured the destruction of 
the centrifuge by simply bombing the site, or by using a 
variation of Stuxnet that did not limit deployment of its payload 
so narrowly, but they did not do this. They lessened “collateral 
damage” to civilians and civilian property and designed Stuxnet 
in a way that sacrificed operational efficiency. 
Falling under “proportionality,” however, is the area in 
which current LOAC rules most likely fail to regulate an aspect 
of Stuxnet: the “release” of the worm’s code to the public at 
large. When a worm or virus is released into a computer 
network, it does not destroy itself in the process of doing its 
damage, as a kinetic weapon does. 298  The individuals who 
released Stuxnet thus gave others a powerful weapon with which 
to attack their enemies. The recent development of the Duqu 
                                                                                                             
295. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (explaining the standard to 
which commanders are held). 
296. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the LOAC policy 
goals). 
297. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text (describing the “excessive” 
requirement). 
298. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (noting the proliferation of 
Stuxnet to numerous computers after its initial deployment). 
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virus demonstrates this principle.299 While it is not known who 
developed Duqu, commentators have speculated that a third 
party, unrelated to Stuxnet’s initial development, may have 
taken Stuxnet’s code and modified it for their own uses.300 
Should future use of Stuxnet’s code by third parties factor 
into a proportionality analysis? Under current LOAC rules, the 
issue is still governed by whether a commander should rationally 
“expect” the resulting harm.301 With this in mind, it is not 
unreasonable to “expect” that someone with malicious intent 
could redesign Stuxnet to cause harm. There are numerous 
unanswered questions that must be considered in a rational 
expectation test: how likely it is that the source code will be 
decrypted?; how likely it is that the decrypted code will be made 
publicly available?; what kind of damage could reasonably be 
caused by new versions of the malware?; how central to the new 
malware would the original code have to be to connect the 
subsequent harm to the original attack?; and how far into the 
future would these connections extend? It seems impossible to 
answer some of these questions realistically. Predicting what 
every criminal group, terrorist cell, hacker, and government 
would do with the code of a cyber weapon seems to be an 
unworkable test for a commander to apply. While the “rational 
expectation” standard is straightforward and easy to administer 
on a physical battlefield, and also seems to apply well to both the 
immediate and knock-on consequences of a cyber attack, it is 
questionable whether it can effectively regulate subsequent third 
party action following the release of a cyber weapon. New 
regulations therefore may be necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Stuxnet almost certainly foreshadows a fundamental 
change in modern warfare. It demonstrates that a well-
orchestrated CNA can strike a target with greater precision, 
greater damage to the enemy, and less collateral loss of life and 
property than a kinetic weapon. Will the change in warfare, 
                                                                                                             
299. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (describing the Duqu virus). 
300. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (speculating about who may be 
responsible for Duqu). 
301. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting the proportionality 
analysis is covered by the “expectation” standard). 
894 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:842 
however, be so drastic that it also necessitates a change in the 
LOAC? The answer appears to be both “yes” and “no.” 
The principles of distinction, discrimination, and 
proportionality, when applied to Stuxnet, further the LOAC 
policy goals of reducing overall destruction in warfare and 
reducing unnecessary harm to civilians and civilian property. 
Further, evidence that Stuxnet’s programmers may have 
designed it to conform with the LOAC, and the subsequent 
benefits that that conformity brought, demonstrates that 
compliance with the LOAC is possible, practical, and beneficial. 
In this respect, the LOAC seems to adequately regulate Stuxnet. 
Stuxnet therefore should be considered a piece of evidence that 
fundamental alterations to the LOAC are not necessary to 
regulate cyber weapons. 
The current LOAC principles, however, appear unable to 
properly address the dangers associated with the acquisition of 
Stuxnet’s source code by third parties. The worldwide 
proliferation of such a weapon may require additional treaties to 
regulate this potential danger. Whether such a treaty is feasible, 
given the proven effectiveness of cyber weapons, remains to be 
seen. 
 
